Judicial Supremacy and Nonjudicial Interpretation of the Constitution by Gant, Scott E.
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly
Volume 24
Number 2 Winter 1997 Article 3
1-1-1997
Judicial Supremacy and Nonjudicial Interpretation
of the Constitution
Scott E. Gant
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Scott E. Gant, Judicial Supremacy and Nonjudicial Interpretation of the Constitution, 24 Hastings Const. L.Q. 359 (1997).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly/vol24/iss2/3
Judicial Supremacy and Nonjudicial
Interpretation of the Constitution
By Scorr E. GANT*
Table of Contents
I. W ho Interprets? .......... ..............................  361
A. Today's Prevailing View ............................ 362
B. Who Interprets?: Refining the Question ............ 364
II. Competing Accounts of Who Interprets ................ 366
A. Judicial Supremacy .................................. 367
1. The Judicial Roots of Judicial Supremacy ....... 367
2. Critics and Criticism of Judicial Supremacy ..... 369
B. Legislative Supremacy .............................. 373
C. Executive or Presidential Supremacy ............... 379
D. Nullification or Confederational Departmentalism.. 383
E. Departmentalism ................................... 383
III. Judicial Supremacy Revisited ........................... 389
A. Recast Judicial Supremacy .......................... 390
1. Advantages of Judicial Supremacy .............. 391
2. Nonexclusivity and Recast Judicial Supremacy.. 392
3. Nonexclusivity at Work: Adopting an
Interpretive Self-Image ......................... 394
4. Noninsularity: Dialogue and Equilibrium ....... 396
5. Less-Than-Final Judicial Finality ................ 399
B. Perceptual Advantages of Recast Judicial
Suprem acy .......................................... 400
1. Combating Cynical Positivism .................. 400
2. Judicial Supremacy: Myth, Legitimation, and
Social Solidarity ................................ 401
C. Departmentalism's Vices and Virtues ............... 404
* B.A., Wesleyan University, 1991; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1995; Associate,
Crowell & Moring LLP, Washington, D.C. The author thanks Laurence Tribe for his help-
ful comments and advice. Bruce Peabody's careful readings were instrumental in improv-
ing this work. Judge Anthony Scirica, Judge Louis Pollak, Marcelo Etchebarne, Kim
Kessler, Alfred Levitt, Adam Rappaport, and Richard Zack also provided thoughtful sug-
gestions and much needed assistance.
[359]
360 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 24:359
1. Taking Stock of Departmentalism .............. 404
2. What Departmentalists Forgot: The People's
Constitution .................................... 407
D. The Political Question Doctrine and Commerce
Clause Jurisprudence: Illustrations of
Departmentalism? ......... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 412
1. The Political Question Doctrine ................ 413
2. Modem Commerce Clause Jurisprudence ....... 414
IV. The Relevance and Utility of the "Who Interprets"
Inquiry .................................................. 418
A. Congress as a Constitutional Interpreter ............ 419
1. The Line Item Veto Act ........................ 422
2. The Defense of Marriage Act .................. 426
B. Judicial Independence and Judicial Critics .......... 429
C. Proposition 187 and Some Tough Questions for
Nonjudicial Interpreters ............................ 435
V. Concluding Thoughts ................................... 438
Marbury ... declared the basic principle that the federal judici-
ary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution,
and [this] principle has ever since been respected by this Court
and the country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our
constitutional system.'
Each public officer who takes an oath to support the Constitu-
tion swears that he will support it as he understands it, and not
as it is understood by others.. . . The opinion of the judges has
no more authority over Congress than the opinion of Congress
has over the judges, and on that point the President is independ-
ent of both
Whoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any written or
spoken laws, it is he who is truly the lawgiver, to all intents and
purposes, and not the person who first spoke or wrote them. 3
1. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
2. President Andrew Jackson, Veto Message (July 10, 1832), in 3 MESSAGES AND PA-
PERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1144 (1897) (justifying his veto of a bill establishing a national
bank).
3. Benjamin Hoadley, Bishop of Bangor, Sermon Before the King of England
(March 31, 1717), in GARRY WILLs, ExPLA rING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST 130 (1981).
L Who Interprets?
This Article grapples with a fundamental question: Who other
than the judiciary has responsibility for constitutional interpretation? 4
This question has both a descriptive and a normative component; it
asks who does interpret the Constitution, and who should. The an-
swer to each part of the question is of great importance. Ascertaining
who does interpret the Constitution is central to a full understanding
of our political-legal culture. Developing an account of who should
interpret the Constitution is essential to our vitality as a nation com-
mitted to constitutional governance.
Part I of this Article briefly explores the relevance and signifi-
cance of the "who interprets?" 5 question, while clarifying what we
seek to find out by asking it. Part II describes five models which, to
varying degrees, plausibly present defensible answers to the query.
Part III presents my own view. It explains the features of, and justifi-
cations for, what I deem the most compelling account of who does,
and who should, interpret the Constitution. Part IV examines a
number of current legal issues which illustrate the pertinence and util-
ity of inquiries about who interprets the Constitution.
Ultimately, I articulate and defend a revised model of judicial
supremacy. It offers a way of thinking about judicial supremacy which
accounts for the subtleties of the interpretive process and better ex-
plains who interprets the Constitution under our existing interpretive
scheme. This revised model also builds on the descriptive capabilities
of judicial supremacy and urges a diffusion of interpretive responsibil-
ity. This diffusion fosters the interpretive capacities of nonjudicial ac-
tors and vests their interpretations with enhanced significance. Such a
reorientation in interpretive responsibility would maintain the advan-
tages associated with the judiciary's authoritativeness while amplifying
the virtues of nonexclusive or extrajudicial constitutional
interpretation.
4. A parallel inquiry can be made concerning interpretation of nonconstitutional
sources of law. While some of the issues raised are similar, this Article is limited to an
exploration of constitutional interpretation.
5. This question is a modified version of the query posed by Walter F. Murphy in
Who Shall Interpret?: The Quest for the Ultimate Constitutional Interpreter, 48 REv. POL.
401 (1986) [hereinafter Murphy, Who Shall Interpret?]. See also WALTER F. MuRIim Er
AL., AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1986) [hereinafter MuRPHY ET AL.,
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION].
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A. Today's Prevailing View
The prevailing view, generally embraced by the public,6 by law-
yers,7 and entrenched in basic civics lessons, is that the Supreme
Court-and the "lower" federal courts-interprets the Constitution
and decides its meaning.8 Embedded in this view is the idea that the
Court is the final arbiter of what the Constitution means-it is a con-
ception advancing "judicial supremacy" vis-a-vis the task of
interpretation.
In spite of the widespread adherence to this generic characteriza-
tion of judicial supremacy,9 there is no similar consensus about some
6. In 1987 the Hearst Corporation conducted a survey about public knowledge of,
and views on, the Constitution. Presenting the results of the survey, the Washington Post
reported that six in ten people responded that the Supreme Court is the final authority on
constitutional change. The author of the Post's article stated that the six in ten had re-
sponded "correctly." See Ruth Marcus, Constitution Confuses Most Americans; Public Ill-
Informed on U.S. Blueprint, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 1987, at A13.
7. That lawyers hold such a view should not be surprising if, as I presume is true,
constitutional law classes pay little, if any, attention to the question "who interprets?" A
glance at some of the leading casebooks in the field reveals that some fail to distinguish the
query from the concept of judicial review. See, e.g., WILLIAM COHEN & JONATHAN D.
VARAT, CONSTrrTrIONAL LAW 33-39 (9th ed. 1993) (excerpting quotations which implicate
the question who interprets, without discussing the matter, or separating it from the con-
cept of judicial review); RONALD D. ROTUNDA, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 10-11
(4th ed. 1993) (raising the issue of ultimate interpretive authority, but in the context of a
discussion of judicial review). Others do differentiate the inquiries, but still dedicate mini-
mal attention to who interprets. See, e.g., GERALD GUNTHER, Is Constitutional Interpreta-
tion a Special or Exclusive Judicial Function?, in INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 20-28 (5th ed. 1992); GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 50-54
(1991) (short note on judicial exclusivity). A major exception to this trend is a casebook
written predominantly by political scientists engaged in the study of "public law." MUR-
-PHY ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 5; see also Gary Apfel, Whose
Constitution Is It Anyway?: The Authority of the Judiciary's Interpretation of the Constitu-
tion, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 771 (1994) (examining the treatment in constitutional law trea-
tises of the interpretive authority of other branches of government); cf. Michael Stokes
Paulsen, Protestantism and Comparative Competence: A Reply to Professors Levinson and
Eisgruber, 83 GEO. LJ. 385,393 (1994) [hereinafter Paulsen, Reply to Professors Levinson
and Eisgruber] (explaining that the inclusion of accounts repudiating judicial supremacy "is
almost invariably not the way that Constitutional law is taught these days"); W. Michael
Reisman, International Incidents: Introduction to a New Genre in the Study of International
Law, 19 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 8 n.13 (1984) (positing that insofar as law schools fail to teach
that constitutional adjudication involves a process in which nonjudicial actors participate,
formally and informally, "there is no comprehensive course on constitutional law in any
meaningful sense in American law schools").
8. My use of "Court" and "courts" refers to the Supreme Court and the federal
courts respectively. For purposes of this Article, little hinges on differentiating between
them, so I will use the two terms interchangeably.
9. See Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Most Competent Branches: A Response to Pro-
fessor Paulsen, 83 GEO. L.J. 347, 371 (1994) (This is "an age when judicial supremacy is
taken for granted."); Michael S. Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to
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more subtle questions. Must nonjudicial actors abstain from interpre-
tation, or merely accept judicial interpretations when they conflict
with others? What is the scope of a judicial "interpretation"-how
far, if at all, does it extend beyond a particular case's holding, or apply
to other factual circumstances? There is no prevailing view as to how
these questions should be answered. Nevertheless, the essential prem-
ise of judicial supremacy-that courts say what the Constitution
means-dominates contemporary conceptions of the relationship be-
tween government and the Constitution, and enjoys adherence by
many legal scholars. 10
Accordingly, some would put to rest discussions about who inter-
prets." I urge that we resist any such temptation, and instead invite
debate about this crucial dimension of our constitutional scheme. The
discussion remains important in several ways, three of which warrant
brief comment.
First, it is critical we have ongoing reflection and discourse about
the nature, role, and meaning of the Constitution in our polity. "Who
interprets?" is a foundational question about which any constitutional
society must develop views in order to achieve mature self-under-
standing. Second, as a descriptive matter, numerous interpretive acts
reveal a less-than-unwavering commitment to judicial supremacy.
These apparent departures from the model of judicial supremacy de-
mand explanation.
Finally, the dominance of judicial supremacy as an account of
constitutional interpretation promotes what I call "cynical positivism."
Say What the Law Is, 83 GEo. L.J. 217, 298 (1994) [hereinafter Paulsen, Executive Power]
("Our generation is ... accustomed to thinking in judicial supremacist terms."). Paulsen's
article should not be confused with another article with a similar name. See Martin S.
Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725 (1996) (discussing the separa-
tion of powers).
10. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (2d ed. 1986);
RONALD DwORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 370 (1986); JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, Ti INTELLIGIBLE
CONSTITUTION 6 (1992) ("The Court's constitutional law is... effectively the supreme law
of the land until the Court overrules itself or is overruled by amendment.") (footnote omit-
ted); Abner J. Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?, 61
N.C. L. REv. 587, 610-11 (1983) ("[The] system was designed to give the courts the final
say."); see also SUSAN R. BURGESS, CONTEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY: THE
ABORTION AND WAR POwERS DEBATES 7-12 (1992) (discussing the support of scholars on
the political left and right for the notion that once the court has spoken its words are final);
cf JOHN AGRESTO, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 86 (ex-
plaining the longstanding appeal of the idea of a final interpreter of the Constitution within
the central government itself).
11. Especially those who confuse it with judicial review, which has been the focus of
such intense debate over recent decades that many in legal academia have grown weary
deliberating about it. See infra Part II.A.1.
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Cynical positivism is the fusion of the view that "the Constitution is
what judges say it is"' 2 with a judgment that such human-generated
conceptions of constitutional meaning are derived from mere political
or personal preferences and with a deepening sense of disappointment
about this state of affairs.' 3 Cynical positivism threatens the legiti-
macy of the judiciary and undermines the commitment to governance
by constitutional principles.
For these and other reasons, many legal scholars wish to revive
debate over who interprets. Notwithstanding my characterization of
judicial supremacy as well entrenched in the public psyche, as well as
in the minds of many academicians, views about the descriptive or
normative appropriateness of judicial supremacy are by no means
uniform.14
B. Who Interprets?: Refining the Question
What are we really asking when we inquire about who interprets
the Constitution? Two basic distinctions will help guide the inquiry.
First, as previously indicated, the "who interprets" problem has both a
normative and a descriptive dimension. While at times discussions in
this Article may not explicitly distinguish between the two, the reader
ought to be mindful of the separateness of these components of the
inquiry. Second, there is a basic distinction between "finality" and
"exclusivity" in constitutional interpretation. The question of who, if
anyone, offers final or authoritative interpretations is one matter,
while whether interpretations can, or should, be propounded by more
than one interpretive agent is quite another.
Erwin Chemerinsky, focusing on who should be the authoritative
interpreter of the Constitution, suggests three possible answers.15
One is that no branch has superior authority-all are equal in this
regard. A second possibility is that interpretive responsibility is allo-
cated to different departments or branches of the federal government,
12. See also AGRESTO, supra note 10, at 157 ("[T]he most serious of potential dangers
[is] ... the possibility that the judiciary will substitute its principles for the Constitution's,
and then actively enforce its visions autonomously and unchecked."); cf. CHARLEs EVANS
HuGrHEs, ADDRESSES AND PAPERS 139 ("[T]he Constitution is what the judges say it is.").
13. See e.g., AGRESTO, supra note 10, at 106 (describing as "awkward" the "premise
that the Constitution is what (or whatever) the justices care to say it is"); Jed Rubenfeld,
Reading the Constitution as Spoken, 104 YALE L.J. 1119, 1120 (1995) (asserting there is a
cynicism about the coherence and legitimacy of constitutional interpretation).
14. See infra Part II.A.2.
15. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION (1987) [hereinafter
CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION].
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depending on the topic or constitutional provision involved. 6 Finally,
it is possible that ultimate interpretive authority is vested in a single
branch.
It is important to note that the three possibilities enumerated by
Chemerinsky address the issue of who is the authoritative interpreter
of the Constitution.17 Any account of interpretive roles must provide
an answer about who is the final or authoritative interpreter. But in-
terpretive exclusivity is a separate issue; even if one branch is identi-
fied as the authoritative interpreter, must other branches abstain
altogether? If not, what roles do the other branches play, and what
should their self-conceptions as interpreters be?
Keeping both the normative-descriptive and the finality-exclusiv-
ity dichotomy in mind should help illuminate the path ahead and pro-
vide a framework for assessing competing responses to the overriding
inquiry into who interprets.' 8
16. 'This, according to Chemerinsky, is the most apt description of contemporary af-
fairs. See id. at 84.
17. By "authoritative" Chemerinsky means having the final say, substantively as well
as sequentially, in the event of a conflict over constitutional meaning.
18. Before proceeding, I wish to note two limitations on the subject of this Article.
First, interpretations of the Constitution which someone seeks in some manner to foster
acceptance of, or to move from one's mind into the social arena, are my subject. In other
words, this project concerns only thoughts which are intended for submission into the so-
cial interpretive process, rather than "private" thoughts. No one can deny, as a descriptive
matter, that people interpret the Constitution in their own thoughts-at least from time to
time. Moreover, I readily concede that "private" interpretation inevitably influences the
ideas entering the "public" interpretative arena. But unless people attempt to convey their
interpretations to others, our capacity to study them is limited. Because the realm of pri-
vate interpretations holds little promise of a rewarding exploration, it is not addressed in
this Article.
The second limitation concerns the relationship between the questions "who inter-
prets?" and "how to interpret?" Admittedly, the divide between who interprets and how
to interpret is permeable. Debates about "who" often rely on notions about how the roles
various prospective interpreters occupy affect their relative interpretive dispositions and
methodologies. Moreover, to the extent this Article encourages nonjudicial actors to as-
sume more active roles as constitutional interpreters, how they should interpret is surely
important. This Article discusses the development of interpretive self-images for
nonjudges. But it does not address, or respond to the substantial literature about, method-
ologies of constitutional interpretation. See, eg., PHILIP BOBBITr, CONSTrrTUONAL IN-
TERPRETATION (1991); ROBERT H. BoRK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990); JOHN
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRusT: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); CASS R.
SuNS'EIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993); LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C.
DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTON (1991); MARK V. TUsHNET, RED, WHITE, AND
BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1988); Philip Bobbitt, Reflections
Inspired by My Critics, 72 TEx. L. REv. 1869 (1994); Stephen M. Griffin, Pluralism in
Constitutional Interpretation, 72 TEx. L. REv. 1753 (1994); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text
and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation,
108 HARV. L. REv. 1221 (1995) [hereinafter Tribe, Reflections on Free-Form Method].
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H. Competing Accounts of Who Interprets
A decade ago Walter Murphy took up the question "who shall
interpret?"' 9 Murphy was primarily concerned with the normative di-
mension of this question. As a starting point, Murphy looked to the
Constitution itself, and what the text says about interpretation. For
instance, inherent in Congress's authority to make "all laws... neces-
sary and proper for carrying into execution" other powers enumerated
in Article I2° is some responsibility and capacity for Congress to make
judgments about the Constitution's meaning.2' Senators, representa-
tives, and other government officials are bound by an oath to "sup-
port" the Constitution.22 Similarly, Article II requires Presidents to
abide by an oath to "preserve, protect and defend" the Constitution.23
Arguably, these oaths call for the exercise of interpretive functions.24
Finally, Article III's extension of judicial power to "all Cases, in Law
and Equity, arising under this Constitution" serves as the basic textual
authorization for courts' participation in the interpretative process.25
These terse textual references themselves provide little guidance
for thinking about who interprets as a general matter, and they surely
fail to instruct about the resolution of disagreements among govern-
ment entities about the meaning or requirements of the Constitution.
The difficulty in such a case is ascertaining "the extent to which and
the circumstances under which some governmental institutions should
defer to other institutions ... [and,] in cases of conflict, whose inter-
pretation should prevail. '26
The remainder of Part II will examine five accounts of who inter-
prets. The accounts are normative in focus, but also address the de-
scriptive capabilities of the models. The discussion in this section
begins with judicial supremacy, and concludes with departmentalism,
19. Murphy, Who Shall Interpret?, supra note 5, at 402.
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Such language is mirrored in the enforcement clauses of
many of the Constitution's amendments, such as the Fourteenth, in Section 5.
21. See Murphy, Who Shall Interpret?, supra note 5, at 404.
22. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3.
23. Id. art. II, § 1.
24. Indeed, Murphy proffers that Lincoln's First Inaugural, asserting the indivisibility
of the Union, was an act to "preserve" the Constitution. Murphy called Lincoln's remarks
"the most important single act of American constitutional interpretation." Murphy, Who
Shall Interpret?, supra note 5, at 405.
But what conduct do these oaths require? Adherence to court interpretations? Or
may oath takers exercise independent judgment? For a discussion of the history and sig-
nificance of the oath clauses, see Paulsen, Executive Power, supra note 9, at 257-62.
25. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2.
26. Murphy, Who Shall Interpret?, supra note 5, at 402.
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which poses the greatest challenge to the normative and descriptive
power of judicial supremacy.
A. Judicial Supremacy
While conceptions of judicial supremacy vary, it has several gen-
eral characteristics. First, judicial supremacy vests the judiciary with
ultimate or final interpretive authority.27 Second, under judicial
supremacy, court-enunciated interpretations are to be understood
broadly, as principles which apply beyond particular cases and their
parties. Third, because judicial supremacy requires acknowledgment
that courts determine constitutional meaning, any subterfuges under-
mining courts' authority are to be avoided.
1. The Judicial Roots of Judicial Supremacy
The Supreme Court's landmark decision in Marbury v. Madison29
is credited with providing the foundation for judicial review-the
power of the Court to declare acts of Congress unconstitutional.3" At
issue was whether Congress acted properly3' in conferring authority in
the Court to issue original writs of mandamus in cases not "affecting
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls [or] those in which
a State [is] a party," the domains over which the Court had original
jurisdiction under Article III. The Court held, in an opinion written
by Chief Justice Marshall, that Congress acted unconstitutionally in
granting this power to the Court.
Judicial review itself is by no means uncontroversial. Critics note
that Marshall's justification for asserting the federal judicial power to
interpret and apply the Constitution is not conclusive.32 In his treatise
on American constitutional law, Laurence Tribe explains, "It is not
27. Judicial supremacy therefore falls within the ambit of the third of Chemerinsky's
categories.
28. These features of judicial supremacy suggest nothing about interpretive exclusivity.
What is, or should be, the interpretive role of nonjudges under judicial supremacy? On
this point, there is no obvious or dominant perspective, so attention must be paid to partic-
ular accounts of judicial supremacy to discern their views about whether the judiciary is the
exclusive interpreter of constitutional meaning.
29. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
30. However, some commentators argue the issue of judicial review was by no means a
new one. See, ag., David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Powers of
the Federal Courts, 1801-1835, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 646, 655-56 (1982); see also LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-2, at 23 n.3 (2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUnONAL LAW].
31. By adopting a particular provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789.
32. See TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrUTIONAL LAW, supra note 30, § 3-2, at 25 & n.9; see
also Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEx. L. Rnv. 373, 389 (1982).
Winter 19971
368 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 24:359
clear.., what significance should be attached to the fact that neither
Marshall nor anyone else has successfully established that independ-
ent judicial review, but no alternative, is consistent with constitutional
text and structure." 3 Nor is judicial review of the sort justified in and
flowing from Marbury inevitable in a constitutional scheme. In some
countries, the legislatures' interpretations of constitutions are defini-
tive, and courts defer to legislatures to reconcile tensions between
statutes and constitutional provisions.3 4
Nevertheless, the essential elements of Marshall's justification of
federal judicial review of acts of Congress are familiar: The Constitu-
tion is the supreme law of the land, and it is the province of the judici-
ary, particularly of the Supreme Court, to say what that law means.
Yet Tribe urges that we not conflate the twin assumptions underlying
Marbury:5 First, the assumption that the Constitution is supreme
law, and, second, the assumption that it is the "province and duty of
the judicial department, to say what the law is."3 6 Only the latter as-
sumption, and the meaning it has taken on during the nearly two cen-
turies since its utterance, remains contentious. This assumption rests
at the core of the controversy over who interprets, which leads many
academicians to trace the roots of judicial supremacy back to
Marbury.7
However, the concept of judicial review is not synonymous with
the concept of judicial supremacy.3 8 In explaining his view of the dif-
ference, Murphy suggests that judicial supremacy involves more than
the power of judicial review. While judicial review authorizes courts,
when deciding cases and controversies, to refuse to give effect to an
act or mandate of a coordinate branch of government, judicial
supremacy creates "the obligation of coordinate officials not only to
obey that ruling but to follow its reasoning in future deliberations. 3 9
The argument that Marbury established judicial supremacy, quite
apart from judicial review, was never more emphatically stated than
33. TRIBE, A ERICAN CONsTrrtONAL LAW, supra note 30, § 3-2, at 25.
34. See i& at 25 n.10.
35. See id- § 3-3, at 27.
36. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137.
37. See supra note 7.
38. However, contemporary debates about judicial review and attendant claims about
the nature and wisdom of "judicial restraint" in fact energize much of current discourse
over who shall interpret. Chemerinsky argues that debate over the legitimacy of judicial
review is futile and misguided. Instead, he encourages a debate which includes the matter
of who is the authoritative interpreter of the Constitution. C'IMERINSKY, INTERPRETING
mE CONs TTUTIoN, supra note 15, at 1, 24.
39. Murphy, Who Shall Interpret?, supra note 5, at 407.
by the Court itself in Cooper v. Aaron.40 In Cooper the court as-
serted: "Marbury... declared the basic principle that the federal judi-
ciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and
[this] principle has ever been respected by this Court and the Country
as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional
system." 41
On its face, this statement appears to be a ringing endorsement of
judicial supremacy. One reading of Cooper is that the "Court's inter-
pretation is itself the 'supreme law of the land."'42 Many scholars
identify Cooper as the moment when the Court truly declared itself
the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.43 Whether or not Cooper
established judicial supremacy, 44 the principle of judicial supremacy
has been embraced by the Court several times since Cooper, and ex-
tended to cases involving Congress45 and the executive branch.46 As
recently as 1992, the Court said that, in the minds of the people, it is
"invested with the authority to decide.., constitutional cases and
speak before all others for [the people's] constitutional ideals." 47
2. Critics and Criticism of Judicial Supremacy
Notwithstanding the fact that the Supreme Court appears to have
embraced judicial supremacy, the concept has its critics. Laurence
Tribe, for one, is wary of judicial supremacy in its strongest form, inso-
far as it "ignores the reality that, at least so long as the manner in
which our nation's fundamental document is to be interpreted remains
open to question, the 'meaning' of the Constitution is subject to legiti-
mate dispute, and the Court is not alone in its responsibility to address
that meaning."48 Tribe proposes that "a variety of actors must make
their own constitutional judgments, and possess the power to develop
interpretations of the Constitution which do not necessarily conform
to the judicially enforced interpretation articulated by the Supreme
40. 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (addressing Arkansas's noncompliance with federal desegrega-
tion orders).
41. Id. at 18.
42. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTTUTONAL LAW, supra note 30, § 3-4, at 34.
43. See AGRE o, supra note 10, at 104; BURGESS, supra note 10, at 3; Paulsen, Execu-
tive Power, supra note 9, at 225.
44. See BURGESS, supra note 10, at 2 (explaining why Marbury is mistakenly under-
stood as having done so); Eisgruber, supra note 9, at 348 ("[Marbury] does not establish
judicial supremacy.").
45. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
46. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
47. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 868 (1992).
48. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTMONAL LAW, supra note 30, § 3-4, at 34-35 (citations
omitted).
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Court. ' 49 Among the potential alternative interpreters Tribe lists are
the President, legislators, state courts, and the public.50
For Tribe, central to the notion that a variety of actors must make
their own constitutional judgments is the distinction between the Con-
stitution itself and the exercise of power under the Constitution, or
the "concept of Constitutional law" versus "judicial enforcement of
that law."'51 Tribe maintains that, read as a whole, Cooper does not
require the adoption of judicial supremacy. Tribe concludes that it is
"not difficult to reconcile indeterminate constitutional law-constitu-
tional law which recognizes, within limits, the equal legitimacy of dif-
fering interpretations-with a determinate adjudicatory process. 52
Despite the proliferation of federal judicial power, the Constitution is
open "at any given time to competing interpretations limited only by
the values which inform the Constitution's provisions themselves, and
by the complex political processes that the Constitution creates-
processes which on various occasions give the Supreme Court, Con-
gress, the President, or the states, the last word in constitutional
debate. '53
Tribe is by no means alone in questioning the desirability of a
model of constitutional interpretation which anoints the judiciary the
ultimate arbiter of its meaning. It is worth articulating briefly some of
the other arguments against judicial supremacy, distinguishing those
which challenge its descriptive accuracy from those which challenge
the desirability of judicial supremacy. Some accounts, of course, do
both, as appears to be the case with Tribe,
As a descriptive matter, American history is replete with rejec-
tions of judicial supremacy by government actors outside the judiciary.
For instance, many Presidents have challenged the rationale of judicial
supremacy. Thomas Jefferson often criticized the notion that the judi-
ciary is the ultimate arbiter of all constitutional questions. As Presi-
dent, Jefferson pardoned those prosecuted under the Sedition Act of
1798, which he viewed as unconstitutional, notwithstanding that it was
upheld by the federal judiciary.54 Andrew Jackson was also a critic of
49. Id. at 35.
50. See id. at 35 nn.21-24.
51. Id. at 37.
52. Id. at 38.
53. Id. at 42.
54. See BURGESS, supra note 10, at 3; Paulsen, Executive Power, supra note 9, at 255-
56.
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judicial supremacy, as reflected in his challenge of the Court's judg-
ment in McCulloch v. Maryland in his "Veto Message" of 1832.11
A favorite President among critics of judicial supremacy is Abra-
ham Lincoln. One of his stands against judicial supremacy was his
contention that Dred Scott v. Sandford56 was an unconstitutional rul-
ing which he was unwilling to allow to serve as a basis for nationaliz-
ing slavery. 7 On another well-known occasion, Lincoln refused to
obey the Court's order after it issued a writ of habeas corpus.5 8
More recently, President Ronald Reagan's Attorney General,
Edwin Meese, proclaimed in a speech: "[Constitutional interpreta-
tion is not the business of the Court only, but also properly the busi-
ness of all branches of government."59 Other modem Presidents have
bristled at aspects of judicial supremacy, and argued for their own au-
thority to interpret the Constitution.6 °
Many academicians who have closely examined constitutional law
conclude that judicial supremacy poorly describes our legal regime.
Chemerinsky, for example, posits that a model which assigns the role
of final arbiter to different branches of government according to the
constitutional provision in question6' may best describe the current
system. Among the evidence frequently cited in support of this view
is the political question doctrine.62
Other interpretive acts cast doubt on judicial supremacy's de-
scriptive capacities. For instance, there are areas of executive and leg-
islative activity where government officials act on their own
interpretations of the Constitution. These views may not even be ar-
ticulated and are not reviewable by other branches of the govern-
55. See BURGESS, supra note 10, at 4.
56. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
57. See AGRESTO, supra note 10, at 86-95; BURGESS, supra note 10, at 5-6; ROBERT A.
BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CoNFLIcr (1992).
58. See Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487); see also
Paulsen, Executive Power, supra note 9, at 223 n.16, 276-83. The nature of habeas corpus
has transformed since Lincoln's time. See generally WILLrAM F. DUKER, A CONSTrru-
TIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS (1980).
59. Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979, 985 (1987).
60. See generally Christopher N. May, Presidential Defiance of 'Unconstitutional'
Laws: Reviving the Royal Prerogative, 21 HASTINGS CONT. L.Q. 865 (1994). See also infra
Part II.C.
61. See CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 15, at 84,97-98.
62. See id. at 98 ("[T]he political question doctrine allocates interpretation of some
constitutional provisions to the electorally accountable branches of government."); Mur-
phy, Who Shall Interpret?, supra note 5, at 414 (explaining that the doctrine makes sense in
the context of such an allocative model); infra Part III.D.1.
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ment.63 If a court cannot get its hands on a case or controversy which
allows it to undo a nonjudicial interpretation, it cannot serve as au-
thoritative interpreter in that matter. Indeed,
[o]n one level, the practical power of other governmental actors
to employ differing constitutional interpretations is obvious: so
long as they do not involve themselves in justiciable controver-
sies coming within the subject-matter limits of article III, the
Supreme Court's view of the Constitution cannot be brought to
bear, and those other governmental actors will be free to inter-
pret and apply the Constitution as they deem best.'
Under these and other circumstances, interpretations by nonjudicial
actors may never arise in a case or controversy which would enable a
court to displace those interpretations.
One could also argue judicial supremacy is not an accurate de-
scriptive account because the nature of judicial adjudication itself
makes judicial supremacy either unnecessary or impossible. The argu-
ment goes like this: Courts, if supreme at all, are only so by virtue of
the authority vested in them under Article III to render, and demand
obedience to, decisions arising from particular cases and controver-
sies. Since no two cases are alike, courts only decide cases rather than
propound the authoritative meaning of the entire Constitution.65
From a normative standpoint, there are several bases for criticiz-
ing judicial supremacy. Many interpreters look to the Framers' dispo-
sitions for guidance about how we ought to conduct our constitutional
affairs today. Yet some claim that judicial supremacy is inconsistent
with the Framers' intentions.66
63. For example, legislators likely rely on nonjudicial interpretive judgments which do
not lead to the adoption of legislation, and therefore afford no occasion for courts to assess
their interpretive judgments. Likewise, the President may act upon such views in domains
where justifications are neither required, nor reviewable. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Presi-
dential Review, 40 CASE W. REs. L. PrEv. 905 (1990) (discussing, what in Part lI.C I have
labeled, Presidential "zones of autonomy").
64. See TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrruTIONAL LAW, supra note 30, § 3-4, at 35-36.
65. See Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1001,
1008 (1965) ("Under Marbury the Court decides a case; it does not pass a statute calling
for obedience by all within the purview of the rule that is decided."); see also BICKEL, supra
note 10, at 259-64; Daniel A. Farber, The Supreme Court and the Rule of Law: Cooper v.
Aaron Revisited, 1982 U. ILL. L. REv. 387, 388-89; Meese, supra note 59, at 983; Paulsen,
Executive Power, supra note 9, at 273-74.
66. See, e.g., Paulsen, Executive Power, supra note 9, at 236 (although Paulsen purports
to reason from the "premises" advanced by the Framers and denies subscribing to "original
intent"); AGRESTo, supra note 10, at 10.
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Other familiar complaints are that judicial supremacy effectively
gives the judiciary the power to govern 67 and that judicial supremacy
conflates the Constitution and constitutional law.68 Critics further ar-
gue interpretation is too important to be left to a single branch.6 9
When interpretation is left to a single branch, there is a limited incen-
tive for that branch to strive to persuade others of the appropriateness
of its interpretations. Were other branches of the government vested
with a substantial interpretive role, there would be an emphasis placed
on "reason" in rendering interpretive judgments. The more it is nec-
essary for one branch to convince other branches to accept its judg-
ment, the more critical the quality of its analysis must be.
Furthermore, the oft-made charge that judicial review is an-
tidemocratic likewise can be made against judicial supremacy.
"Although the Constitution in a sense stands beyond ordinary poli-
tics[,] ... democracy is surely less threatened by a system of constitu-
tional interpretation in which many may share significant and
respected roles than by a system with but one authoritative voice."'70
Insofar as judicial supremacy might be said to stifle such role-playing,
concerns about the dynamic between democracy and control over in-
terpretation are understandable.
Standing in the shadow of these critiques of judicial supremacy, I
concede that our current legal regime at times operates other than we
would expect if judicial supremacy were an accurate descriptive ac-
count. What this suggests to me, however, is that it is our account of
judicial supremacy, rather than the idea itself, which requires recon-
sideration. As for the normative critiques, judicial supremacy's short-
comings are not inherent ones. The perceived failings of judicial
supremacy apply only to some visions of it. A modified model of judi-
cial supremacy can avoid many of judicial supremacy's imagined de-
fects while capturing the substantial virtues associated with it. Part III
of this Article sets out such an account of judicial supremacy.
B. Legislative Supremacy
In addition to judicial supremacy, Murphy describes four other
models of authoritative constitutional interpretation. Among these is
the argument for "legislative supremacy." In its pure form, one sup-
67. See AGRESTO, supra note 10, at 81; Meese, supra note 59, at 989; see also Hoadley,
supra note 3.
68. See TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUIONAL LAW, supra note 30, § 3-3, at 27; Meese,
supra note 59, at 981.
69. See Paulsen, Executive Power, supra note 9, at 222.
70. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUONAL LAW, supra note 30, § 3-4, at 39.
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poses, an account of legislative supremacy must maintain that in al
circumstances congressional interpretation of the Constitution trumps
that of any other branch, including the judiciary. Murphy finds few
systematic assertions of legislative supremacy since the nation's found-
ing.71 Notwithstanding the apparent dearth of outright assertions of
legislative supremacy, there are several arguments which can be made
suggesting it is neither descriptively implausible nor normatively
distasteful.72
Among the normative claims which can be advanced on behalf of
legislative supremacy is its confluence with "democratic" ideals. Inso-
far as the Constitution should remain a living document of, and for,
the people, arguably the branch of government thought most respon-
sive to the people ought to serve as the ultimate interpreter of the
ultimate guide for governing our polity. While this itself is not an ar-
gument for legislative supremacy, it lends credence to the view that
ultimate constitutional interpretation is and ought to be more "demo-
cratic" than is supposed.
As a descriptive matter, there are several ways in which Congress
might be understood as occupying the role of authoritative interpreter
vis-a-vis a particular matter or set of issues. One stems from Katzen-
bach v. Morgan.73 Morgan involved the constitutionality of section
4(e) of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, which provided that no person
who successfully completed sixth grade in an accredited Spanish-lan-
guage school in Puerto Rico could be denied the right to vote on ac-
count of an inability to read or write English. The Court upheld
Congress's authority to adopt the provision, by virtue of Congress's
power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.74 The Court
explained that nothing in the Constitution prohibited Congress from
acting under Section 5 on the basis of an interpretation of the Equal
Protection Clause more expansive than that enforced by the Court
itself 75
There is disagreement about the meaning, and continuing valid-
ity, of Morgan.76 Nonetheless, one possible reading of Morgan is that
71. The most prominent examples, in his view, include efforts by radical Republicans
after the Civil War, and claims by some Jeffersonians around the time of Marbury. See
Murphy, Who Shall Interpret?, supra note 5, at 410-11.
72. Cf. infra Part IV.A (discussing Congress as a constitutional interpreter).
73. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
74. "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provi-
sions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
75. See TRIBE, A ERICAN CONsTrrunToNAL LAw, supra note 30, § 3-4, at 36.
76. See id. §§ 5-12 to -15, at 330-53; Stephen L. Carter, The Morgan 'Power' and the
Forced Reconsideration of Constitutional Decisions, 53 U. Ciii. L. REv. 819 (1986); Matt
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it recognizes Congress's authority under the enforcement provision of
the Fourteenth Amendment to interpret the Constitution.77 Among
the responses to Morgan was Henry Monaghan's exposition of a the-
ory of "constitutional common law."78 Monaghan presents a model in
which there are two spheres of constitutional law. In the first, the
sphere of "pure" constitutional law, only interpretation by the Court
is permissible. The second sphere is that of "constitutional common
law"-"a substructure of substantive, procedural, and remedial rules
drawing their respective inspiration and authority from, but not re-
quired by, various constitutional provisions. 79 In this sphere, as Tribe
recounts, "Congress would not merely participate as the Supreme
Court's equal, but would hold the power to substitute its own views
for those of the Court."80 Whether or not one is persuaded by
Monaghan's conception of constitutional common law, it reflects a de-
sire to find a role for Congress in the interpretive process,8' and may
well draw on a more general intuition that Congress is engaging in
some forms of "interpretation."
Another explanation that Congress may, under certain condi-
tions, authoritatively interpret the Constitution comes from the work
of Lawrence Sager. Sager has explained that the federal judiciary
sometimes declines to uphold constitutional claims, not because of
any particular interpretation of the Constitution, but because of insti-
tutional concerns, such as federalism and the limits of "judicial compe-
tence."'  In such instances, the Court's rendering of a constitutional
norm may not exhaust the full potential-or develop the full mean-
ing-of the Constitution's provisions. These norms are said, in
Pawa, When the Supreme Court Restricts Constitutional Rights, Can Congress Save Us?: An
Examination of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1029 (1993).
The Morgan "power" has been discussed in recent years as a possible source of congres-
sional authority for the enactment of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994) [hereinafter RFRA]. See, e.g., Marci A. Hamilton, The Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act: Letting the Fox into the Henhouse Under the Cover of Sec-
tion 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 357 (1994); Bonnie I. Robin-
Vergeer, Disposing of the Red Herrings: A Defense of the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 589 (1996). The constitutionality of RFRA is an issue before the
Court this Term. See City of Boerne v. Flores, No. 95-2074 (argued Feb. 19, 1997).
77. This rationale might apply to other enforcement provisions in the Constitution.
See, e.g., Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
78. Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword- Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1
(1974).
79. Id. at 2-3.
80. See TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTONAL LAW, supra note 30, § 3-4, at 37.
81. See id.
82. See Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitu-
tional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1212 (1978).
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Sager's nomenclature, to be "underenforced." He has argued that the
contours of judicial norms which are underenforced should be under-
stood as demarcating only the boundaries of the federal courts' role in
enforcement, and that "the unenforced margins of underenforced
norms should have the full status of positive law which we generally
accord to the norms of our Constitution. 83 Insofar as one accepts
Sager's thesis, Congress retains for itself the capacity to determine the
full meaning of underenforced constitutional provisions and princi-
ples. In a sense, this view operates similarly to Morgan, in that it de-
lineates circumstances when Congress takes over where the courts
have left off and assumes the role of authoritative interpreter.8
A third possible vehicle for Congress to act as the ultimate consti-
tutional interpreter involves the much debated constitutional issue
concerning the breadth of Congress's power to limit the jurisdiction of
courts under Article 111.85 Article III may allow Congress to deny the
federal courts jurisdiction over certain cases, thereby precluding court
review of affected legislation. If, in that legislation, Congress explic-
itly or implicitly embraces a particular reading of the Constitution,
then Article III consequently enables Congress to become the author-
itative interpreter of the Constitution in these matters.86
Proposals to eliminate federal jurisdiction over certain topics
have been floated for decades.87 The limited success of such measures
may be attributable to doubt about whether they are constitutional.88
Indeed, whether Article III can be read to allow such limitations on
83. Id. at 1221; see also Laurence H. Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The
New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L.
REv. 1065, 1084-91 (1977).
84. See TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 30, § 3-4, at 39.
85. See generally ERWIN CiEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDIcnON § 3, at 167-205 (2d
ed. 1994); Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An
Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895 (1984).
86. Presumably, however, state courts would retain jurisdiction over such matters, and
might compete with Congress as an alternate interpreter. See CHEMERiNSKY, supra note
85, FEDERAL JURISDICnION §§ 3.3, 10.2, at 186-202, 575-77; TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrU-
TIONAL LAW, supra note 30, § 3-4, at 40-41 (discussing Oregon v. Hass); Paul Bator, The
State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 586 (1981)
(addressing the role of state courts in the development of federal constitutional norms).
87. TWo prominent examples from the 1980s include S. 158, 97th Cong. (1981); H.R.
3225, 97th Cong. (1981) (bills which would limit federal jurisdiction in abortion cases); S.
481, 97th Cong. (1981); H.R. 4756, 97th Cong. (1981) (bills which would restrict federal
jurisdiction over cases involving voluntary school prayer). See also Mikva, supra note 10,
at 589 n.10.
88. See Mark V. Tushnet, Legal Realism, Structural Review, and Prophecy, 8 U. DAY-
TON L. REv. 809, 813 (explaining that a consensus among scholars that such measures are
unconstitutional has operated to keep Congress from adopting them).
jurisdiction is a disputed matter. And, of course, someone must
render an interpretation of the Constitution about Congress's power
to limit Article III jurisdiction in this manner. Under a traditional
conception of Marbury, the federal courts would themselves decide
the meaning of Article III-whether they could be denied jurisdiction
by such acts of Congress.8 9 As indicated above, this tells us little
about what to do if Congress disagrees, or how a legislator considering
such a proposal ought to conceive of his or her responsibilities vis-a-
vis the matter of interpreting that proposal's constitutionality. But ju-
risdictional limitations present at least a possible circumstance under
which Congress would effectively have more authoritativeness than
the courts as an interpreter.
Finally, accounts of the "formal" and "informal" mechanisms for
constitutional amendment may suggest certain conditions under which
Congress acts as a privileged interpreter. Looking first to the formal
amendment process, Murphy posits "the primary option open to Con-
gress and the President when fundamentally disagreeing with the
Court is to amend the Constitution."9 ° Surely, in the meta-interpre-
tive sense, nothing is more fundamental to the power to interpret than
the power to say what something means by formally clarifying or
amending it. Congress is the only branch of the federal government
which plays a formal role in the amendment process set out in Article
V.91 It, more so than either the executive or judiciary, is likely to play
a major role in any alterations in the text of the Constitution.9a
Scholarly work on "informal" constitutional amendments may
also suggest a similar privileged role for Congress as an interpreter. In
a provocative essay written in 1991, Sanford Levinson challenged the
presumed answer to the question, "How many times has the United
89. See CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDIcTION, supra note 85, § 3.1, at 171 (discussing
the question of a court's jurisdiction to decide whether it has jurisdiction).
90. Murphy, Who Shall Interpret?, supra note 5, at 413. This is a tradition which Mur-
phy identifies as extending back to the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment in response
to the Court's decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dali.) 419 (1793).
91. Congress may, by a two-thirds vote of each house, propose amendments to the
Constitution to the states. U.S. CONST. art. V. Article V also grants Congress some con-
trol over how the states may ratify an amendment, and case law has vested Congress with
additional procedural authority over the amendment process. See generally Walter Dellin-
ger, The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change: Rethinking the Amendment Process, 97
HARV. L. REv. 386 (1983); Laurence H. Tribe, A Constitution We Are Amending: In De-
fense of a Restrained Judicial Role, 97 HARV. L. REv. 433 (1983) [hereinafter Tribe,
Amending].
92. Congress has proposed every amendment thus far adopted as part of the Constitu-
tion. See Tribe, Amending, supra note 91, at 436.
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States Constitution been amended?" 93 In that piece he explores the
boundaries between interpretation and amendment, and maintains
that discussions of "amendments" which focus exclusively on Article
V are, "to put it bluntly, wrong."94 Without articulating criteria for
distinguishing amendment from interpretation, he insists the divide is
less clear than legal formalism would suggest. Levinson's comments
are relevant to examining claims of legislative supremacy insofar as his
argument for less constrained conceptions of both amendments and
interpretation sets forth the possibility that constitutional change can
be propelled by any one of a number of actors, including Congress. 95
Bruce Ackerman has also argued for a less constrained notion of
constitutional "amendment."96 Ackerman posits that America has ex-
perienced three constitutional regimes, or "constitutional mo-
ments"-roughly corresponding to the Founding, Reconstruction, and
the New Deal. Like Levinson, he emphasizes that, in the grand sense,
"amendment" takes place outside the Article V rubric. Ackerman
views much of the Supreme Court's work as an attempt to synthesize
these "moments. ' 97 Under his theory, the essential framework for in-
terpretation is established outside the judiciary, by "the People."
93. The supposed and formal answer in 1991 was 26. Since 1991, in what is itself a
bizarre constitutional tale, a twenty-seventh amendment has been added to the Constitu-
tion. The amendment provides: "No law, varying the compensation for the services of the
Senators and Representatives, shall take effect until an election of Representatives shall
have intervened." Originally transmitted to the states for ratification in 1789, it received
the required number of ratifications over two centuries later, and pursuant to authority
granted under 1 U.S.C § 106b, was certified as the TWenty-Seventh Amendment by the
Archivist of the United States on May 18, 1992. See generally Stewart Dalzell & Eric J.
Beste, Is the Twenty-Seventh Amendment 200 Years Too Late?, 62 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 501
(1994).
94. Sanford Levinson, Accounting for Constitutional Change (Or, How Many Times
Has the United States Constitution Been Amended? (A) <26; (B) 26; (C) 27; (D) All of the
Above), 8 CONST. COMMENTARY 409, 431 (1991), modified and reprinted in RESPONDING
TO IMPERFECTION (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995).
95. As for the substance of Levinson's argument, while I appreciate its originality and
intellectual energy, it strikes me as ahistorical and limited in its appreciation of the benefits
of the formal amendment process. Levinson seems to discount the possibility that having a
formal conception of, and requirements for, an "amendment" contributes to dialogue and
shapes constitutional politics and discourse in a particular (and useful) way. In addition,
amendments themselves, as explicit textual treatments, are special. When Levinson asks if
amendments are necessary he does not appear mindful that an "amendment" has no mean-
ing until given life by actors-by interpreters. Thus, amendments may well be necessary if
people think they are necessary.
96. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE aE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991) [hereinafter ACK-
ERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE]; see also Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional
Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453 (1989); Bruce Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Con-
stitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984).
97. See ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, supra note 96, at 131.
Even if one suspects Ackerman too easily resorts to labeling
these moments "amendments," 98 the point made clear by both he and
Levinson is that nonformal, nonjudicially forged constitutional mean-
ing takes shape from time to time. Congress may play the leading role
among the branches in fashioning new constitutional meaning during
these periods, and thus, in an important sense, occupy a privileged
interpretive role.
In the end, however, these assessments of the limits of court-de-
veloped constitutional norms, of the prospect of constrained Article
III jurisdiction, and of the amendment process are not arguments for
comprehensive legislative supremacy. At best, they illustrate the pos-
sibility that, in certain domains, Congress may effectively serve as au-
thoritative, or at least a pre-eminent constitutional interpreter-the
bulk of the interpretive work and authority is still left with the judici-
ary. Thus, the strongest statement that can be made about legislative
interpretive authority is that Congress and the courts are nonexclusive
interpreters which share the distinction of being ultimate interpreters.
This state of affairs, however, begins to resemble a model less like
traditional accounts of "legislative supremacy" than an alternative
model-departmentalism. 99
C. Executive or Presidential Supremacy
Having discussed both judicial and legislative supremacy, in the
next account the executive branch, or the President, occupies the posi-
tion of interpretive supremacy. Murphy pays virtually no attention to
this model in his article, and explains that no President "has seriously
pushed Presidential supremacy."'10 Yet he is quick to point out that
"one might argue that such a theory underlay much of Lincoln's ac-
tions during the Civil War."101 Indeed, while no President has consist-
ently advocated executive supremacy, numerous Presidents and
members of the executive branch have intermittently espoused the
98. See Cass R. Sunstein, New Deals, NEw REPUBLIC, January 20, 1992, at 32 (book
review) (making such a charge). In fact, several commentators have criticized Ackerman's
account of "moments" and his conception of "amendment" outside of Article V. See, e.g.,
Tribe, Reflections on Free-Form Method, supra note 18, at 1286 (arguing the "theory that
constitutional change can be effected by a particular pattern of events bearing no relation
to the procedures of Article V... is fundamentally flawed"); William Fisher III, The De-
fects of Dualism, 59 U. Cm. L. REv. 955 (1992); Michael Klarman, Constitutional Fact!
Constitutional Fiction: A Critique of Bruce Ackerman's Theory of Constitutional Moments,
44 STAN. L. Rlv. 759 (1992) (review essay).
99. See infra Part II.E (discussing departmentalism).
100. Murphy, Who Shall Interpret?, supra note 5, at 420 n.28.
101. Id.; see also Paulsen, Executive Power, supra note 9, at 75-76.
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virtues of independent executive interpretive judgments. 0 2 While the
notion of pure executive supremacy has yet to find an exponent
among academicians, several have extolled the practice of executive
review generally, as well as executive authority to interpret the Con-
stitution, in particular.103
The strongest statement to date advocating executive review
comes from Michael Stokes Paulsen, who has written about executive
branch authority to interpret the Constitution.10 4 His thesis is a direct
and engaging one about the coordinacy of the departments of the fed-
eral government: "[T]he power to interpret law is not the sole prov-
ince of the judiciary; rather it is a divided, shared power not delegated
to any branch but ancillary to the functions of all of them within the
spheres of their enumerated powers."' 0 5
Paulsen asserts the President has "will"-the power to make law,
which is exercised by participating in the legislative process, and by
threat and exercise of the veto, as well as through the substantial au-
thority to prescribe rules under the auspices of the modern adminis-
trative state.'0 6 Ancillary to the power to make law is the power of
"judgment"-to interpret the laws the President is charged with
executing.
102. See generally Easterbrook, supra note 63, at 914-15; May, supra note 60 (offering
historical assessment of Presidential refusal to comply with laws on constitutional
grounds); Meese, supra note 59. See also Michael J. Wieser, Beyond Bowsher: A Separa-
tion of Powers Approach to the Delegation of Budgetary Authority, 55 BROOK. L. REv.
1405 (1990).
By way of example, prior to Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919 (1983), Presidents refused to give effect to "legislative veto" provisions. See E. Donald
Elliot, The Administrative Constitution, the Constitution, and the Legislative Veto, 1983 Sup.
Cr. REv. 125. In 1984 President Reagan decided not to enforce part of the Competition in
Contracting Act on the grounds that it violated the Constitution by vesting executive
power in the Comptroller General. See Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102 (9th
Cir. 1988), withdrawn on other grounds, 893 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1989). Moreover, no Presi-
dent has accepted the War Powers Act as binding on the executive. See BURGESS, supra
note 10, at 65-108.
103. In addition to the works discussed below, see Steven G. Calabresi and Saikrishna
B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994); Geoffrey
P. Miller, The President's Power of Interpretation: Implications of a Unified Theory of Con-
stitutional Law, 56 LAW & CoirrnMn. PROns. 35 (1993); cf. Mark R. Killenbeck, A Matter
of Mere Approval?: The Role of the President in the Creation of Legislative History, 48
ARK. L. REv. 239 (1995) (arguing that the Constitution contemplates an essential execu-
tive voice in the interpretation of legislation, and advocating an augmented executive role
in the construction of legislative histories of statutes).
104. See Paulsen, Executive Power, supra note 9.
105. Id. at 221.
106. See id. at 219-20.
As for the relationship of the executive to the other departments,
Paulsen states that "[t]he President is not bound by Supreme Court
interpretations of the Constitution... any more than the courts are
bound by Congress's or the President's interpretations" relating to
any matter falling "within the sphere of his governing powers."' 7 In-
deed, Paulsen presses on, proclaiming the President may "decline to
execute acts of Congress on constitutional grounds, even if
those... grounds have been rejected by the courts"-even in specific
cases where judicial decrees order obedience.10 8 He draws this con-
clusion from a theory which has as its underlying premise that the
branches of the federal government are to be separate and coordinate,
and power is to be distributed among them. The theory itself is that
"the power to interpret law, including the Constitution, is like any
other power too important to vest in a single set of hands."'1 9 And
while he grounds his views in what he understands to be those of the
Founders, he purports to have traced the Founders' premises to their
logical conclusion. Paulsen concedes that the result is radical. No
one, he explains, with the possible exception of Lincoln, has affirmed
a power of executive review that would allow the President to refuse
to enforce judicial decrees in cases within the Court's purview." 0
Notwithstanding the force of his claim, Paulsen's structural argu-
ment does not itself champion executive "supremacy" per se.111 But,
as he proceeds to explain, the effective power of the executive to in-
terpret the law is by far the greatest." 2 Contrary to the idea that the
Court has "the last word," through its power to execute or decline to
execute judgments rendered by courts, it is the executive which effec-
tively has the final say in most controversies." 3
Recognizing the additional powers his account vests in the execu-
tive, Paulsen nonetheless remains confident that Congress's powers of
the purse and impeachment, as well as public and other forms of pres-
107. Id. at 221.
108. Id. at 221-22.
109. Id. at 222.
110. See id. at 226.
111. Paulsen strongly denies that the model he advances can be equated with "execu-
tive supremacy." Rather, he insists "[c]o-equal executive interpretive authority does not
mean supreme executive interpretive authority because it does not compromise the judici-
ary's power of independent judgment within its sphere." Id. at 302.
112. See id. at 223.
113. See id. Paulsen calls this "the Merryman power," taken from Ex parte Merryman,
17 F. Cas. 144 (No. 9,487), in which President Lincoln refused to obey the Court's order in
issuing a writ of habeas corpus. See also Michael S. Paulsen, The Merryman Power and the
Dilemma of Autonomous Executive Branch Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 81 (1993).
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sure, will keep executive branch interpretation within "acceptable
bounds. 11 4 Indeed after more than one hundred pages of unrelenting
support for executive review, Paulsen tempers his proposal by advo-
cating "executive restraint," featuring three voluntarily assumed
guides: deference to the views of other branches in the formulation of
the executive's interpretation; accommodation of the executive's posi-
tion to the conflicting views of other departments; and a restrained
interpretive methodology." 5
Before Paulsen, Frank Easterbrook wrote about domains of Pres-
idential action which may be based on constitutional views, and yet
which pose no challenges to interpretations held by other branches.
Four such categories are pardons, vetoes, additions,1 6 and proposals
for new legislation." 7 I call these "zones of autonomy"-areas where
a President may rely on any bases for action, including a view of what
the Constitution means."18
Yet for Easterbrook these domains do not delimit the extent of
executive interpretive authority. Easterbrook contends there are oc-
casions when the President may act on views at variance with statu-
tory law when believing the law is at odds with the Constitution." 9
He explains the President must have the ability to evaluate courts'
decisions for their principles and application beyond the parties to a
particular case, and "declare laws unconstitutional in the course of ap-
plying the governing rules."'20 He makes this assertion while ac-
knowledging that granting the President the power to generalize vests
the President with power to make independent constitutional deci-
sions. Then, pressing on, Easterbrook extends his embrace of Presi-
dential review, claiming that the President can act even without
relying on "similar decisions," for "it is still the Constitution that sup-
plies the rules"' 21
While Paulsen and Easterbrook disagree about a variety of points
regarding executive interpretive authority,' - they share an over-
114. See Paulsen, Executive Power, supra note 9, at 224. It is by no means clear, how-
ever, how he measures "acceptability."
115. See id. at 332-42.
116. "Additions" refer to the President's authority to provide more procedural protec-
tions than statutory minima require. See Easterbrook, supra note 63, at 908.
117. See id. at 906-11.
118. "[H]ow odd it would be if a President, free to consider the welfare of donors in
casting vetoes, could not consider the Constitution!" Id. at 909.
119. See id.
120. Id. at 914.
121. Id. at 924.
122. See Paulsen, Executive Power, supra note 9, at 271, 292 (discussing Easterbrook).
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whelming commitment to the view that there has been, and ought to
be, a substantial role played by the executive which cannot be ac-
counted for by judicial supremacy. They further agree there are do-
mains in which executive interpretations undoubtedly reign supreme.
Insofar as their perspectives do not set out conceptions of comprehen-
sive executive authority, however, they bear significant similarities to
theories characterized as "departmentalist." Accordingly, their ideas
are revisited in the discussion of departmentalism below.
D. Nullification or Confederational Departmentalism
A fourth model described by Murphy, albeit briefly, is "nullifica-
tion" or "confederational departmentalism."' 23 Under it, states are
the final interpreters of the Constitution. "The basis of [the] theory is
that the Constitution is a compact not among the American people as
a whole, but among sovereign states. Thus, as an interpreter of the
Constitution-the compact to which it is a party-an individual state
is equal in authority not only to any other state but also to the na-
tional government."' 24 Herbert Wechsler called the claim of state leg-
islatures to a role in the interpretive process the "oldest . . . put
forward in our history,"'" and until the eve of the Civil War at least
seven states repeated this type of argument. 2 6
But the Civil War itself "effectively invalidated such claims.' 27
Confederational departmentalism seems untenable in the postbellum
period-even in view of today's emerging movement of congressio-
nally led governmental decentralization. Yet, insofar as the argument
sets out that states are equal in status with other states and the na-
tional government, rather than supreme, this account too begins to
resemble departmentalism.
E. Departmentalism
Finally, we arrive at the fifth model described by Murphy-
departmentalism. Most simply put, departmentalism refrains from
123. Murphy, Who Shall Interpret?, supra note 5, at 420 n.28; see also Paulsen, Executive
Power, supra note 9, at 312-20 (exploring and expounding upon Justice Story's effort to
discredit the position of state nullifiers in his Commentaries on the Constitution of the
United States).
124. See MURPHY ET AL., CON TrruTiONAL INTERPR-TATION, supra note 5, at 257; cf.
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1875 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
("The ultimate source of the Constitution's authority is the consent of the people of each
individual state, not the consent of the undifferentiated people of the Nation as a whole.").
125. Wechsler, supra note 65, at 1007.
126. See MURPHY Er AL., CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 5, at 257.
127. Murphy, Who Shall Interpret?, supra note 5, at 420 n.28.
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anointing any one branch as "supreme" interpreter, and instead as-
serts equality, or "coordinacy," among two or more departments. It
advances the claim that all of the branches, or "departments," of the
federal government co-exist, equal in their capacity and authority to
interpret the Constitution.'2 8
While not a distinction Murphy offers, I wish to differentiate be-
tween two forms of departmentalism-fixed and fluid. The former
accepts that there is such a thing as authoritative interpretation in a
given matter, but rejects the notion of a single supreme interpreter
regarding all matters. Instead, allocation of interpretive authority var-
ies by topic or constitutional provision, and that allocation changes
little, or not at all, over time. 129 The latter form of departmentalism is
characterized either by the view that allocations are made but are not
unalterable, or by the view that no allocation is to be made at all-
that all departments have an equal claim as interpretive agents in all
matters.
Departmentalism is not a wholly novel concept. Paulsen lines up
a parade of Founders who have expressed skepticism about judicial
supremacy and affinity for the principles of coordinacy, including
Madison, 30 Hamilton,' 3 ' Jefferson, 3 2 and James Wilson.' 3 While
their views reflect varying degrees of commitment to the notion that
all branches of the government share authority as constitutional inter-
preters, it is clear the core principle of departmentalism took hold of
them.
Modem efforts to articulate the nature of departmentalism are
largely propelled by dissatisfaction with judicial supremacy. For in-
stance, while Murphy notes a general pattern in the American system
of accepting the courts' constitutional interpretations, he identifies
three features of our system which militate against supporting-nor-
matively and descriptively-the model of judicial supremacy: (1)
128. Of course, there are other conceptions of interpretive authority which reject the
validity of a single authoritative interpreter but which decline to limit the list of acceptable
interpreters to departments of the federal government. Levinson, for instance, champions
constitutional "protestantism," which eschews hierarchical interpretive schemes. See SAN-
FORD LEVINSON, CoNsTrrUrrIoNAL FArrH (1988); see also infra note 220.
129. Included among fixed departmentalists are those contending that constitutional
design itself dictates the terms of allocation.
130. See Paulsen, Executive Power, supra note 9, at 229-38, 308-11; see also Murphy,
Who Shall Interpret?, supra note 5, at 412.
131. See Paulsen, Executive Power, supra note 9, at 245-52.
132. See id. at 62-65; see also Murphy, Who Shall Interpret?, supra note 5, at 412; BUR-
oGss, supra note 10, at 3.
133. See Paulsen, Executive Power, supra note 9, at 238-40, 252-55.
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many problems, such as those involving immigration, foreign policy,
and national defense, do not lend themselves to judicial resolution; (2)
judges often defer to Congress; and (3) even in situations amenable to
judicial resolution, the general pattern of acceptance of courts' inter-
pretations has "been broken enough for tradition to supply a shaky
basis for judicial supremacy.' '1 34
Murphy's strategy for responding to the normative dimension of
the problem-deciding who should interpret-resembles a fixed
departmentalist account. He would allocate interpretive authority to
a particular branch of the federal government depending on the
"range or reach of judicial authority, the nature of the substantive is-
sue, and the nature of the constitutional provision, whether clause,
practice, tradition, or principle of relevant political theory. "135 Mur-
phy clearly hopes to transform the inquiry about who should interpret
into one which asks about the kinds and degrees of deference institu-
tions might owe and/or confer upon one another as constitutional in-
terpreters under varying circumstances.
Although I have described Murphy's approach as a fixed depart-
mentalist account, he calls it a "modified version of departmental-
ism. ' ' 136 He maintains that, if widely accepted, his view of
departmentalism-which ascribes different areas of competence,
whose parameters could change over time-would mitigate conflict
between the judiciary and the other departments of the federal
government.
Murphy is not alone among contemporary legal thinkers in his
adherence to, or at least sympathy with, departmentalism.137 Susan
Burgess,138 concerned about the detrimental effects of judicial
supremacy, 139 has embraced a departmental alternative. Burgess's
normative program is to augment "constitutional consciousness," and
134. Murphy, Who Shall Interpret?, supra note 5, at 413.
135. Id. at 414.
136. Id. at 417.
137. See, e.g., AGRESTO, supra note 10; SOTIRIos A. BARBER, ON WHAT THE CONSTI-
TUTION MEANS (1984); BURT, supra note 57; STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES: CITI-
ZENSHIP, VIRTUE AND COMMUNITY IN LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM (1990). See generally
BURGESS, supra note 10, at 137-38 n.50; cf. LEvINSON, supra note 94 (endorsing "Protes-
tant" constitutionalism, which rejects centralization of interpretive authority in the Court).
138. BURGESS, supra note 10.
139. Among the harms she perceives is an impairment of the tendencies and capacities
of other branches of government, and of citizens, to interpret the Constitution. See id. at
139 n.65.
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"authority.' 140 She sets out a model which locates six levels of consti-
tutional consciousness. With each successive level of constitutional
consciousness the authority of branches of the government is increas-
ingly distinguished from the authority of the Constitution. 14 1 Burgess
hopes her model will supplant what she conceives of as facile cost-
benefit analyses typically employed in evaluating the departmental-
ism-judicial supremacy debate.
Burgess identifies three principal benefits afforded by depart-
mentalism: (1) debate about constitutional meaning would replace
congressional attacks on the judiciary; (2) "the quality of the judici-
ary's constitutional interpretation would be improved"; and (3) "con-
gressional [and] public sensitivity to constitutional issues would
deepen."' 42 She likewise identifies objectionable consequences which
might be supposed to arise under a departmentalist scheme: (1) a
deepening of legal and political confusion; (2) a diminished commit-
ment to safeguarding individual rights; and (3) the prospect that either
the legislature and/or the executive would eventually gain supremacy
over the judiciary. 4 3
Burgess's advocacy for departmentalism is rooted in two basic
ideas. First, an underlying premise of her work is that there is a dis-
tinction between judicial and constitutional supremacy. 44 In her
view, departmentalism appropriately reflects a commitment to the
Constitution above all else.' 45 Second, her notion of constitutional
consciousness, and of having no single branch authoritatively interpret
the Constitution, seeks to encourage awareness of, and widespread
substantive discourse about, the meaning of the Constitution and its
relevance to difficult and divisive issues.
Other modem departmentalists are more specific in articulating
the contours of an alternative to judicial supremacy. As indicated ear-
lier, Paulsen and Easterbrook advocate forms of departmentalism in
140. What she means by these is never fully evident. The closest she comes to defining
"constitutional consciousness" is her explanation that the term is used to "capture the idea
of the Constitution as a focus and shaper of the parameters of the community's political
and legal discourse." Id. at 24.
141. See id. at 24-27. She further explains that a "discourse that successfully broadens
constitutional authority will move through several levels of constitutional consciousness
rather than simply attaining one level and remaining there." Id. at 26.
142. Id. at 13-19
143. See id. at 19.
144. Cf. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 30; text accompanying
notes 51-53.
145. See BURGESS, supra note 10, at 12 ("[D]epartmentalists reject judicial finality as
inconsistent with constitutional supremacy.") (footnote omitted).
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the course of defending their respective conceptions of executive re-
view.1 46 They agree that the President can refuse to enforce statutes
on constitutional grounds, and generally act upon independent judg-
ments about what the Constitution means.147 Yet, as Paulsen points
out, Easterbrook fails to convey whether his vision of departmental-
ism allows the executive branch to refuse to give effect to a statute
where the courts have previously ruled on the question, against the
President's position.148 While some of Easterbrook's comments sug-
gest he is unwilling to go that far, 49 Paulsen does not hesitate in lurch-
ing ahead to the conclusion, "[i]f coordinacy means anything, it means
everything.' 150
Christopher Eisgruber appears to be another departmentalist. In
an article responding to Paulsen, Eisgruber rejects the extremes of
both judicial supremacy and coordinacy (as described by Paulsen). In-
stead, Eisgruber recommends what he calls a "middle principle"-
"comparative institutional competence." Under his account, "no in-
stitution deserves the blind deference of other branches, and no insti-
tution enjoys unqualified supremacy with respect to all controversies,
but, nevertheless, each institution will sometimes owe a constitutional
duty of deference to the decisions (including erroneous decisions) of
another branch.' 5' Insofar as Eisgruber imagines comparative insti-
tutional competence as "produc[ing] a doctrine of deference nuanced
to specific domains,"'152 it bears the hallmarks of a fixed departmental-
ist account. Paulsen seems to agree. Having read Eisgruber's article,
Paulsen asked rhetorically, "Are we really all 'departmentalists'
now?
1153
Despite not identifying himself as a departmentalist, Robert Burt
presents one of the most thorough normative arguments for depart-
146. Their arguments, while focusing on executive authority, posit that Congress also
possesses substantial interpretive power.
147. Cf. Walter E. Dellinger, Legal Opinion from the Office of Legal Counsel to the
Honorable Abner J. Mikva, 48 ARK. L. REv. 313 (1995). Dellinger, in his capacity as Assis-
tant Attorney General of the United States, presented the view in a November 2, 1994
memorandum to then-White House Counsel Abner Mikva that there are circumstances in
which the President may appropriately decline to enforce a statute that he views as uncon-
stitutional. Id.
148. See Paulsen, Executive Power, supra note 9, at 271.
149. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 63, at 927 ("Presidential review is neither a
power to nullify nor a power to disregard judgments.").
150. Paulsen, Executive Power, supra note 9, at 283.
151. Eisgruber, supra note 9, at 348.
152. Id. at 364.
153. Paulsen, Reply to Professors Levinson and Eisgruber, supra note 7, at 385.
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mentalism.'54 He, like Paulsen and others, posits that Madison and
Lincoln represent an interpretive tradition which rejects judicial
supremacy and instead advocates judicial "egalitarianism." Judicial
supremacy, Burt claims, is a form of coercion, and an enemy of demo-
cratic life,'55 which violates the norm of equality. 5 Rather than end-
ing conflicts with purported authoritative constitutional
interpretations, courts should, he suggests, "precipitate a process of
collaboration and accommodation,"' 57 for "constitutional interpreta-
tion does not belong to the Supreme Court alone but must take place
over a prolonged time involving many different institutional partici-
pants.' 58 Burt conceives of an ideal interpretive process as one
where an important dispute is not finally settled until it has been
widely affirmed after cautious and interactive deliberation. 59
The descriptive capacities of departmentalism are also heralded
by some. Returning to a classification described earlier, an important
strand of departmentalist thought is "fixed" departmentalism-which
accepts that in the aggregate there is no branch serving as the ultimate
arbiter of what the Constitution means, but maintains that interpreta-
tion regarding certain matters or textual provisions are allocated to
one of the three departments for authoritative constitutional judg-
ment. Many find fixed departmentalism appealing for its supposed
descriptive capacity. As mentioned earlier, the political question doc-
trine has been explained as conforming with this model.160 Louis
Fisher cites not only the political question doctrine, but constitutional
factfinding and other activities of Congress, as demonstrations of the
legislature's role as interpreter.' 6' Easterbrook also makes clear there
are domains in which the President exercises constitutional judgment
without review. The carving out of such domains by each of these
154. See BURT, supra note 57. For a fine review of Burt's book, see Kathleen M. Sulli-
van, The Nonsupreme Court, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1121 (1993).
155. See BURT, supra note 57, at 375.
156. See id. at 101.
157. Id. at 131.
158. Id. at 99.
159. Burt views Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1957), as the paradigm of
well-conceived court involvement. In contrast, he views Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973),
(wrongly in my view) as an exemplar of detrimental court involvement where the Court
conferred total victory to one side.
160. See also supra Part II.D.
161. See Louis Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation by Members of Congress, 63 N.C. L.
REv. 707 (1985) [hereinafter Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation]; see also Louis FISHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS (1988) [hereinaf-
ter FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES].
branches may also appear to follow an allocative pattern suggested by
fixed departmentalism.
Burgess also finds departmentalism's descriptive capabilities
compelling. While the early part of Burgess's book, Contest for Con-
stitutional Authority, is normative in orientation, the later chapters are
dedicated to examining two case studies of what she deems real-life
illustrations of departmentalism: the abortion and war powers de-
bates. She is quite convinced these controversies evince depart-
mentalism at work, and that judicial supremacy cannot possibly
provide an accurate picture of the character of contemporary constitu-
tional interpretation. 162
Despite differences in focus and terminology employed by com-
mentators discussed in this section, the body of work and perspectives
represented constitute a set of ideas which conform with the essential
tenets of departmentalism. It is departmentalism, particularly "fixed"
departmentalism, which I conceive of as the real descriptive and nor-
mative competitor of judicial supremacy. Moreover, it is my view that
most alternatives to judicial supremacy offered by academicians, and
by those government actors who venture to provide principled sup-
port for their acts of resistance to judicial supremacy are, at their
cores, departmentalist visions of constitutional interpretation.
Il. Judicial Supremacy Revisited
In the course of advocating her "constitutional consciousness" al-
ternative to judicial supremacy, Burgess expresses the hope that "seri-
ous study of [the views of departmentalists] may cause some scholars
to abandon, or at least reconsider, their adherence to judicial
supremacy.' 1 63 The views of departmentalists do warrant attention
and raise important issues. But an assessment of departmentalism
should not induce us to discard judicial supremacy. Rather, depart-
mentalism's challenge to judicial supremacy presents an occasion to
reconsider, and then retain, judicial supremacy.
This Part sets out a revised form of judicial supremacy, which (for
lack of a better term) is called "recast judicial supremacy." Recalling
that the "who interprets" question has both a descriptive and a nor-
mative dimension, recast judicial supremacy also has two components.
It offers a way of thinking about judicial supremacy which accounts
162. She believes that, historically as well as today, departmentalism has tended to
emerge as an alternative to judicial supremacy during periods of legal and political strife.
See BURGESS, supra note 10, at 23.
163. Id. at 12.
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for the subtleties of the interpretive process, and ultimately provides
an improved model for explaining who interprets under our existing
interpretive scheme. As a normative program, recast judicial
supremacy builds on its descriptive capabilities and urges a diffusion
of interpretive responsibility, encouraging the participation of nonju-
dicial actors in the interpretive process. Such a reorientation in inter-
pretive responsibility, when coupled with the advantages of traditional
judicial supremacy (which fails to encourage nonjudicial interpreta-
tion), would yield a unique set of advantages. These advantages make
recast judicial supremacy the interpretive model most appropriate as a
guide for our political-legal order.
A. Recast Judicial Supremacy
As Murphy and others have noted, the capacity of traditional
conceptions of judicial supremacy to explain many interpretive prac-
tices is strained. Numerous interpretive acts, or allocations of inter-
pretive responsibility, appear inconsistent with what traditional
judicial supremacy might be supposed to predict. These descriptive
failings do not, however, condemn all accounts of judicial supremacy.
Instead, they invite a view of judicial supremacy capable of addressing
these apparent inconsistencies.
Recast judicial supremacy is capable of best explaining our ex-
isting interpretive scheme. At the core of recast judicial supremacy
are three descriptive assertions. I will call these assertions recast judi-
cial supremacy's "descriptive troika." They are: (1) the judiciary is
the nonexclusive but "final" interpreter of what the Constitution
means; (2) "final" does not mean insular; and (3) no interpretation is
ever truly final.
This troika moves us closer to capturing how judicial supremacy
really works, and in turn, how constitutional interpretation actually
operates. In fact, with the aid of the descriptive troika, it becomes
evident the principal doctrinal developments which might be sup-
posed to demonstrate departmentalism are explainable as consistent
with judicial supremacy.164
This explanatory model of judicial supremacy also provides the
basis for the normative program of recast judicial supremacy. The
troika-these three features of our interpretive scheme-invite a dif-
fusion of interpretive responsibility. They allow nonjudicial actors to
164. 1 do, of course, accept that there are endless instances of divergence from, or rejec-
tion of, recast judicial supremacy. But sporadic, even though important, departures from
recast judicial supremacy do not render it an incapacitated descriptive model.
contribute their interpretive judgments while retaining the judiciary as
the "final" arbiter of constitutional meaning. Such a diffusion of inter-
pretive responsibility, operating with the advantages of judicial
supremacy, would yield a distinct set of advantages not available
under an alternative model of interpretive authority.
1. Advantages of Judicial Supremacy
Judicial supremacy has numerous advantages. A familiar idea is
that courts should deliver authoritative interpretations because they,
unlike Congress or the executive, are apolitical, and because judges
are granted life tenure. This argument has often been rephrased as
one for a neutral umpire shielded from the passion of political life. 65
A related view is that, as an institution, the judiciary is relatively resis-
tant to majoritarian pressures. 66 Any assignment of ultimate inter-
pretive authority to the political branches is supposed to undermine
the Constitution's own counter-majoritarian protections.
It is further argued that the judiciary's decision-making method
affords a preferable means of interpretation and constitutional evolu-
tion.167 Chemerinsky and others emphasize the special capacity of the
adversarial process which accompanies judicial interpretations to fos-
ter wise deliberation and judgment about the meaning of the
Constitution.168
A second advantage of judicial supremacy concerns the principle
of separation of powers. To the extent we remain committed to the
principle, our tripartite system of government-featuring both over-
lapping functions and distinct powers-is served best by judicial
supremacy. Without ultimate interpretive authority, the judiciary pos-
sesses no powers countervailing those of Congress or the President.
169
Moreover, to allow branches of government to render authoritative
judgments about interpretive issues affecting them is to engage in a
kind of "double counting," by allowing them to wield interpretive
powers as well as their already enumerated powers in pursuit of
whatever interests they may have at a given time.'
7 0
165. See Murphy, Who Shall Interpret?, supra note 5, at 406-09.
166. See CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 15, at 86.
167. See id.
168. See, eg., Michael Rosenfeld, Executive Autonomy, Judicial Authority and the Rule
of Law: Reflections on Constitutional Interpretation and the Separation of Powers, 15 CAR-
Dozo L. REv. 137, 148 (1993).
169. See id.; CHEMERINSKY, INTEMRPRETING THE CONSTTUTION, supra note 15, at 99-
101.
170. Similar sentiments underlie claims that a department should not be a "judge in its
own case." Cf JoHN LocKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 14-16 (C.B. Macpher-
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A third advantage begins as a conceptual point, but has far-reach-
ing practical import. Under a scheme which denies a single branch the
authority to vest the Constitution with meaning-like departmental-
ism, especially fluid departmentalism-the Constitution "would not
have an articulated meaning."'1 71 At its core, the Constitution's mean-
ing is social; it does not exist a priori. Without settled means for
resolving interpretive conflicts, meaning becomes diffuse and argu-
ments over meaning become unmanageable. The alternative is to set-
tle conflicts through the rough-and-tumble of everyday politics. Yet
not only does this stack the deck against judicial judgments, it encour-
ages crises. Under such a scheme, political and constitutional strife
would be too frequent. Paulsen dismisses this concern and assures his
readers that the "likelihood of such scenarios seems grossly exagger-
ated."' 72 His confidence stems from his faith in the operation of
"strong, blunt checks [which] keep each branch within a proper consti-
tutional orbit as determined by the other constitutional actors.' ' 73
But this appears to be a dangerous method of dispute resolution. 74
Constitutional discourse can, and ought to be, conducted according to
more gentle and stability-engendering methods. 75
2. Nonexclusivity and Recast Judicial Supremacy
The foregoing justifications for judicial supremacy present the
virtues of having the judiciary serve as the ultimate arbiter of what the
Constitution means. These advantages are afforded, however, by both
exclusive and nonexclusive judicial interpretation; they derive from
the judiciary's status as authoritative interpreter rather than as sole
interpreter. 76
As suggested earlier, recast judicial supremacy not only allows
for, but depends upon, an interpretive role for nonjudicial actors.
Given the judiciary's ultimate interpretive authority, it may fairly be
son ed., 1980) (1690) (among the features which necessitate a transition to civil society
from a "state of war" is the condition of "men" judging their own cases and the absence of
a common source of appeal).
171. CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSTTUTION, supra note 15, at 96.
172. Paulsen, Executive Power, supra note 9, at 324.
173. Id. (emphasis omitted).
174. That Paulsen's vision seems outmoded is only reinforced by his own analogy, relat-
ing his approach of checks-and-balances to MAD-the nuclear deterrence theory of "mu-
tually assured destruction." Id.
175. Such methods might include "dialogue" and "equilibrium." See infra Part III.A.4.
176. Cf Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 161, at 715 ("Being 'ultimate
interpreter' ... is not the same thing as being exclusive interpreter.").
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asked: What is the use of nonexclusivity? What is added by having
nonjudicial actors engage in interpretation?
I contend the best interpretive practice will be one where there is
a diffusion of interpretive responsibility-where nonjudicial actors
regularly, and with seriousness, deliberate about constitutional mat-
ters relevant to the exercise of their duties, and inject their perspec-
tives into the social interpretive process.
The benefits yielded by a diffusion of interpretive responsibility
are many, but can be grouped into four main categories. To begin
with, like analogous arguments made in the domains of speech and
commerce, there is at least some basis for believing that the more in-
terpretive voices, the better. Notwithstanding the meritorious criti-
cisms leveled at exponents of unfettered markets or speech, the
tradition inspired by thinkers like Milton177 and J.S. Mill, 78 who
shared a vision of the free flow of ideas as a vehicle to truth and
human enrichment, suggests that inviting agents outside the judiciary
to consider seriously and speak out on constitutional matters can only
enrich interpretive judgments, regardless of who may be charged with
rendering the authoritative last word.
A second important byproduct of a diffusion of interpretive re-
sponsibility is its educative function. To the extent the interpretive
process operates solely within the judiciary, the exposure of citizens to
deliberation about, and serious analysis of, constitutional matters is
substantially limited.179 Through the involvement of nonjudicial ac-
tors in the interpretive process, not only will occasions for exposure to
constitutional deliberation be multiplied, but the character of citizen-
engagement will be different and provide a basis for more comprehen-
sive constitutional awareness among the public. For instance, having
Congress serve as a consistent, self-reflective interpreter would pres-
ent numerous circumstances where constituents could engage their
representatives about their views on the meaning of the Constitution,
and participate in collective exchanges about constitutional questions
in a manner like they do about matters concerning government spend-
ing or environmental policies.
A third virtue of diffuse interpretive responsibility involves a pro-
cess somewhat like the reverse of the educative function just de-
177. See JoHm MILTON, AREOPAGITICA (J.C. Suffolk ed., 1968) (1644).
178. See JoHr. S-UART MIL, ON LIBERTY (David Spitz ed., 1975) (1859).
179. Cf. Christopher L. Eisgruber, Is the Supreme Court an Educative Institution?, 67
N.Y.U. L. REv. 961 (1992) (arguing the Court has educative responsibilities and examining
the Court's competence as a teacher).
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scribed. In addition to promoting education about the Constitution,
diffusion also results in our being enriched by the Constitution. Inso-
far as the Constitution embodies a set of values and principles which
are worthy of adherence on the basis of their content (and not merely
because they are in the Constitution), the Constitution must be sup-
posed to bring to bear a certain perspective about issues of the day. In
conducting their business then, Congress and the executive, as well as
state officials, would be enriched by consistently considering the rele-
vance of the Constitution to matters before them. 80
Finally, nonjudicial involvement in interpretation assists courts in
rendering their authoritative judgments. Extra-judicial interpretations
inform other branches, and especially the courts, of a particular
branch's assessments and dispositions. These interpretations not only
provide important and useful background information, which courts
need in order to have a well-developed sense of what is at stake in the
questions before them, but such interpretive perspectives also may be
useful for courts insofar as they reveal something about the govern-
mental actors' activities and views, which courts need in order to
make their own decisions.18 '
These four types of benefits afforded by a diffusion of interpre-
tive responsibility are in no way diminished by having the Court serve
as the authoritative constitutional interpreter. At the same time,
these advantages of diffusion cannot be realized simply by having
other departments participate in the judicial interpretive process as
parties or amici curiae appearing before judicial tribunals. These ad-
vantages are realizable only with a genuine interpretive role for
nonjudges.
3. Nonexclusivity at Work: Adopting an Interpretive Self-Image
While I have touted the principle of diffusion, some discussion of
how it might operate in practice is required. It would be fanciful to
suppose that the political branches could ever completely abstain from
engaging in constitutional interpretation. After all, even if Congress
and the executive wished simply to abide by the will of the courts, this
is all but impossible because the judiciary has not spoken on a great
many questions. Thus, in order to conduct their affairs, other depart-
180. Discussions with Bruce Peabody significantly contributed to the formulation of the
idea in this paragraph.
181. For instance, a legislature's perspective on constitutional meaning might provide
clues for a court about its motivation for acting, which is relevant in some types of constitu-
tional adjudication. See, e.g., Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980); Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229 (1976).
ments will necessarily engage in some interpretation. As the Supreme
Court itself has explained, "[i]n the performance of assigned constitu-
tional duties each branch of the Government must initially interpret
the Constitution, and the interpretation of its powers by any branch is
due great respect from the others."'" The attainment of the virtues of
diffuse interpretive responsibility requires a more expansive interpre-
tive role than the bare minimum required for the performance of as-
signed constitutional duties. But even these alone make clear there is
an interpretive role for nonjudicial actors-a role which can be recon-
ciled with a commitment to ultimate judicial authoritativeness. 83
How should nonjudicial actors conceive of their roles vis-a-vis in-
terpretation? What interpretive self-images should they adopt?
There is a range of possibilities, including: (1) attempt to predict what
a court, at that moment, would do if the issue were before it; (2) apply
principles enunciated by courts in the past; and (3) exercise com-
pletely independent judgment, which might or might not be informed
by interpretive modes and practices employed by courts.
While this sketch of three possible interpretive dispositions is by
no means exhaustive, it suggests there is a fundamental choice which
needs to be made by a nonjudicial interpreter about the relevance of
the courts to its own judgments. Recast judicial supremacy requires
something close to the second of the possibilities just described.184
Under recast judicial supremacy, while the judiciary is the nonexclu-
sive but final interpreter of the Constitution, other branches are
encouraged to engage in interpretation-particularly when interpreta-
tion is called for in the execution of their duties. But recast judicial
supremacy also requires widespread acceptance of the idea that courts
determine constitutional meaning, and of the idea that once a court
has spoken on an issue its views warrant adherence. The more spe-
cific a court's view, and the more relevant its view is to a particular
circumstance, the less uncertainty there should be in the minds of non-
judicial actors about what fidelity to that court's judgment mandates.
182. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974).
183. Indeed, insofar as there will be interpretive "gaps" when courts have not ad-
dressed a particular question, developing a general pattern and practice of serious interpre-
tive discourse will improve the work of nonjudicial actors when they are called upon to fill
these "gaps," as they inevitably will be.
184. Cf. Rosenfeld, supra note 168, at 173 ("[W]ith respect to the duty to abide by valid
Supreme Court precedents, the proper obligation of the President could be said to
be... similar to those of a judge who sits on a federal court of appeals."); Dellinger, supra
note 147, at 314-16 (promoting a mixture of approaches, which resemble both imitation
and prediction).
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Taking seriously and applying court-enunciated principles sup-
ports the vision of judicial supremacy. Mere prediction-driven inter-
pretation reduces nonjudicial actors to second-rate judges.
Alternatively, complete independence from consideration of the role
and statements of courts effectively would negate the essence of the
principles of judicial supremacy.
4. Noninsularity: Dialogue and Equilibrium
The preceding discussion presented an account of how nonex-
clusivity and judicial finality are to be joined, and offered a glimpse of
the role nonjudicial actors would play in the interpretive process
under recast judicial supremacy. At this juncture, I wish to reintro-
duce the second prong of judicial supremacy's descriptive troika-the
idea that "'final' does not mean insular."
The centrality to judicial supremacy of the courts' role as ultimate
interpretive arbiter should now be evident. The notion that "final
does not mean insular" further refines the conception of judicial
supremacy. It is a fact that although courts are assigned responsibility
for having the final say about the Constitution's meaning, their views
are not developed in isolation, or rendered without the profound in-
fluence of others, particularly other branches of the federal
government.
Two processes especially facilitate the judiciary's noninsularity:
dialogue and equilibrium. "Dialogue" is simply a general classifica-
tion for a set of exchanges, formal and informal, by which courts and
nonjudicial actors gain awareness of the views of one another on con-
stitutional questions and attendant issues.185 The courts speak primar-
ily through their opinions and decisions, although less formal channels
185. Other commentators have employed the term "dialogue" to denote a similar pro-
cess, although the specific dimensions of the processes others suggest differ from my ac-
count. See, eg., Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MIcH. L. REv. 577,580-
81 (1993) ("Our Constitution is interpreted on a daily basis through an elaborate dialogue
as to its meaning. All segments of society participate in this constitutional interpretive
dialogue, but courts play their own unique role.") (footnotes omitted); FISHER, CONSTITU-
TIONAL DIALOGUES, supra note 161. Fisher skillfully presents evidence for the case that
constitutional law is "a process in which all three branches converge and interact." Id. at 3.
While ably detailing many of the dimensions of this interactive process-which guards
against insularity in judicial interpretation-Fisher fails to relate his account to broader
themes and principles about the interpretive process, and seems content to catalogue
rather than connect his analysis to any normative program. Moreover, Fisher conflates
what I am describing as dialogue with "equilibrium," a concept introduced later in this
section. For a useful review of Fisher's book, see Neal Devins, The Constitution Between
Friends, 67 TEx. L. Rv. 213 (1988).
for sharing their perspectives are available. 6 The manners in which
courts are spoken to are more varied, and comprehensive. The views
of other branches are transmitted to the courts, most formally, by way
of appearances as parties in cases, or as authors of government poli-
cies challenged in courts. 187 Through conduits like the media, and ac-
ademic and professional literature, courts are bombarded by
information-some of it is directly about constitutional interpretation,
but most of it is not-which shapes the context in which judicial inter-
pretive judgments are formulated.
Diffusion of interpretive responsibility affords a variety of bene-
fits-for both the courts and other departments. To the extent that
this responsibility is accepted and acted upon, the wealth of interpre-
tive judgments produced will provide a rich source of information ex-
changed in the dialogic process described here. Under this scheme,
the courts, while retaining ultimate authority, will have the benefit of
the views of others in rendering their own judgments, thereby guard-
ing against insularity.1 88
In addition to dialogic processes, there are institutional dynamics
which facilitate judicial responsiveness to the interpretive judgments
of other branches. William Eskridge and Philip Frickey have de-
scribed law as in "equilibrium"-a state of balance among competing
forces or institutions. 9 Under their account, "[e]ach branch seeks to
promote its vision of the public interest, but only as that vision can be
achieved within a complex, interactive setting in which each organ of
government is both cooperating with and competing with the other
organs."' 90 While analyses of Congress's and the President's institu-
tional interests and rationality are not unusual, Eskridge and Frickey's
thesis is that the Court too engages in strategic behavior.' 9' More un-
186. These include academic articles, professional conferences, and personal contacts.
187. See FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES, supra note 161, at 24-36.
188. Lisa Kloppenberg has written an interesting article on how "measured" constitu-
tional decision-making-the idea that judges should decide constitutional issues as nar-
rowly as possible-promotes dialogue. See Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Measured Constitutional
Steps, 71 IND. L. REv. 297, 312 (1996) ("measured constitutional rulings by courts might
promote deference to other constitutional decisionmakers, thus encouraging them to par-
ticipate more fully in the development of constitutional law").
189. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword.- Law as Equilibrium, 108
HARV. L. REv. 26, 28 (1994).
190. Id. at 28-29.
191. Cf ROBERT G. McCLosKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 208 (revised by
Sanford Levinson, 2d ed. 1994) (1960) ("[T]he facts of the [Supreme] Court's history im-
pellingly suggest a flexible, nondogmatic institution fully alive to such realities as the drift
in public opinion and the distribution of power in the American republic.").
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usual still is their contention that constitutional interpretation itself is
guided by this dynamic.19
Regardless of whether or not the forces which energize this pro-
cess are, at any given moment, in equilibrium-a balance of compet-
ing institutional pressures-Eskridge and Frickey's argument is
instructive for its emphasis on the extent to which the Court too oper-
ates under institutional constraints. 93 They persuasively explain how
the Court is locked in deep interdependence with the other depart-
ments, and that as a consequence, "institutions will behave strategi-
cally, anticipating the responses of other institutions and signaling the
nature and intensity of their preferences to the other institutions. '1 94
And Eskridge and Frickey are pleased by the state of affairs they per-
ceive. As they explain, "law that is a balance among three interacting
branches is superior to law as it might be produced by a single
institution. 195
Their argument about the dynamics of the interpretive process is
convincing. What their exposition demonstrates is that under any in-
terpretive model, including judicial supremacy, institutional dynamics
make interaction and interdependence among the branches unavoida-
ble. The exaggerated descriptive claims that judicial supremacy cre-
ates an isolated, nonresponsive interpretive fiefdom in the courts fail
to appreciate the relationship Eskridge and Frickey have detailed.
Indeed, in countering the danger of judicial insularity, dialogue
and equilibrium are two sides of a coin-one is intellectual, the other
institutional. Together, they would help reconcile a diffusion of inter-
pretive responsibility with retention of the ideal of judicial authorita-
tiveness, and realize the normative ideal of the recast account of
judicial supremacy advocated in this Article. 9 6
192. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 189, at 29 ("The Court's constitutional inter-
pretation is equally dynamic, transparently accommodating apparent national equilibria.");
cf. Sager, supra note 82.
193. Cf. FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES, supra note 161, at 135-43, 215-21
(describing some of the mechanisms for the executive and Congress to exercise institu-
tional influence over the judiciary).
194. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 189, at 33 (emphasis omitted).
195. Id. at 35.
196. There are certainly additional constraints which mitigate the judiciary's insularity
as an interpreter. "Personal" or "human" influences, including peer pressure from outside
the judiciary and concern with popularity and legacies among the public, surely play a role.
For a discussion of some informal restraints, see DAvID G. BARNUM, THE SUPREME
COURT AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 197-201 (1993). For an examination of the impact of
external political pressures on the Court's decision-making, see JOHN B. GATES, THE
SUPREME COURT AND PARTISAN REALIGNMENT (1990); see also ROBERT F. NAGEL, JUDI-
CIAL POWER AND AMERICAN CHARACrER 45-59 (1994); James G. Wilson, The Role of
JUDICIAL SUPREMACY
5. Less-Than-Final Judicial Finality
The third prong of judicial supremacy's descriptive troika is "'fi-
nal' is never truly final." This refers to two realities. First, due in part
to the dynamics of dialogue and equilibrium, court interpretations are
subject to change over time. Second, the courts themselves are not
static. Courts do not render interpretations, judges do. To the extent
the composition of the judiciary is in flux, so too are its "authorita-
tive" interpretations. 97
Alterations in the composition of courts come primarily with re-
tirements or deaths, and subsequent new appointments. Nevertheless,
the significance of the prospect of removal' 98 is concealed by the in-
frequency of its practice. As "civil officers" of the United States, fed-
eral judges are subject to removal under Article II, Section 4 of the
Constitution.'99 The possibility of impeachment and conviction by
Congress serves as a symbolic and a (weak but genuine) substantive
check on the interpretive autonomy of judges. This power ensures
that Congress need not wait a generation or two to undo "final" deci-
sions rendered by the courts.
Collectively, dialogue, equilibrium, and other factors facilitate
give-and-take between the judiciary and other interpreters of the Con-
stitution-a kind of "continuing colloquy" between courts, political
institutions, and society-at-large, which Alexander Bickel embraced
when he suggested that constitutional principles "evolve[ ] conversa-
tionally" rather than being "perfected unilaterally."200 That constitu-
tional meaning develops in such a manner makes clear the value of
diffuse interpretive responsibility.
Public Opinion in Constitutional Interpretation, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1037 (1993); cf. Mc-
CLOSKEY, supra note 191; Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme
Court as a National Policymaker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957).
197. See BICKEL, supra note 10, at 244 ("[W]hat one means by the ultimate, final judg-
ment of the Court is quite frequently a judgment ultimate and final for a generation or
two."); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT 31-40 (1985)
[hereinafter TRIBE, HONORABLE COURT] (describing the difference a Justice or two can
make on the Supreme Court).
198. Or, for that matter, of "Court packing," as was pursued and abandoned by Presi-
dent Franklin Roosevelt. See TRIBE, HONORABLE COURT, supra note 197, at 66-67.
199. "The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be
removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other
high Crimes and Misdemeanors." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
200. BICKEL, supra note 10, at 240, 244. But see RICHARD D. PARKER, HERE, THE
PEOPLE RULE: A CONSTITUTIONAL POPULIST MANIFESTO 132 n.96 (1994) (applauding
Bickel's fundamental insight of give-and-take between the courts and others as it relates to
judicial review, but calling ideas about "conversation" among the people and the Court
"academic fantasy").
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B. Perceptual Advantages of Recast Judicial Supremacy
As indicated, recast judicial supremacy grafts diffuse interpretive
responsibility onto the interpretive framework already in place, en-
capsulated by judicial supremacy's descriptive troika. Recast judicial
supremacy's appeal as a normative model derives from its capacity to
retain the advantages of judicial authoritativeness while realizing
those produced by encouraging the interpretive judgments of
nonjudges. Many of these advantages have been outlined in the sec-
tions above. But two additional advantages flow from recast judicial
supremacy. It is capable of alleviating cynical positivism of the sort
described earlier.20 1 At the same time, it promotes the legitimacy of
the judiciary.
1. Combating Cynical Positivism
No doubt it is true that the strongest versions of judicial
supremacy-which propose both judicial finality and exclusivity-
tend to discourage serious deliberation outside the judiciary about the
meaning of the Constitution. After all, if only courts get to say what
the Constitution means, then it is judges who possess a monopoly over
interpretation. And judges, to be sure, are only human and possess no
pipeline to the "true" meaning of the document. They are subject to
the same weaknesses as others: error, bias, malice. As described ear-
lier, this circumstance, coupled with other factors, invites cynical posi-
tivism to take hold.
One might imagine abandoning judicial supremacy in favor of
some form of departmentalism as a remedy to this malaise. As Ed-
ward Corwin put it some time ago, "If the Constitution is only 'the
Supreme Court's last guess' then the other departments are entitled to
their guess, too.""2 2
Departmentalism, however, will only deepen the skepticism and
cynicism associated with general understandings of how constitutional
meaning is developed or discerned. At its core, departmentalism, es-
pecially fluid departmentalism, provides no method of arriving at set-
tled meaning about the Constitution. Under departmentalism,
constitutional debates would become transformed into blatantly polit-
ical ones, with no regularized means of resolution rooted in a source
other than institutional politics.
201. See supra Part I.A.
202. EDWARD S. CORWIN, COURT OVER CONSTITUTION 78-79 (1938) (emphasis
omitted).
In contrast, recast judicial supremacy combats cynical positivism.
It encourages a diffusion of interpretive responsibility, engaging citi-
zens and government actors alike. It would make discourse about the
Constitution a collective project, but would stop short of the idea that
the meaning of the Constitution is "up for grabs." Cynical positivists
would therefore have greater appreciation of how, and why, judges
interpret as they do, and consequently they would be less inclined to
dismiss their judgments as blatantly personal or political. In this way,
recast judicial supremacy would mitigate feelings of disenfranchise-
ment and cynicism sometimes produced by traditional judicial
supremacy.
2. Judicial Supremacy: Myth, Legitimation and Social Solidarity
In his seminal work on judicial review, Bickel described the so-
called "mystic function" of the Court, whereby its decisions upholding
something as constitutional serve to legitimate the practice or action
in question.20 3 But what of the Court's legitimacy-from what is it
derived? While Bickel finds that legitimacy "comes to a regime that is
felt to be good and to have proven itself as such to generations past as
well as in the present, '20 4 1 am unconvinced that legitimacy is neces-
sarily self-actualizing.
Instead, affirmative steps must be taken to promote judicial legiti-
macy. Judicial supremacy, even in its current form, engenders broad
popular support and promotes judicial legitimacy. Adherence to judi-
cial supremacy as a foundational understanding of how our govern-
ment works creates a "myth" of sorts-a cousin of Bickel's "mystic
function." This myth is comprised of the unqualified idea that the
courts authoritatively (although not exclusively) interpret the Consti-
tution,20 5 and that the norms enunciated by courts as constitutional
principles are to be given effect.
Why do we need such a myth? In America, constitutional law
comprises a substantial part of our civic religion,20 6 and we have left it
largely to the Supreme Court to fashion and concretize our image of
the Constitution.20 7 A vision of political life without a clear sense of
how to end conflicts about what the Constitution allows or proscribes
would be unsettling to many citizens. The image of finality resting
203. See BICKEL, supra note 10, at 29-33.
204. Id. at 29.
205. In other words, the myth suggests judicial interpretation, and only judicial inter-
pretation, establishes constitutional meaning.
206. Cf. LEvrNsoN, supra note 94.
207. See BICKEL, supra note 10, at 31.
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with the "dispassionate" judiciary, detached from the rough-and-tum-
ble of daily politics, is easy to understand and embrace. The absence
of at least short-term temporal finality, and of first-order conceptual
finality, threatens to strip the Constitution of meaning. Therefore, it is
imperative that judicial supremacy remain the popular account of our
interpretive process.
The myth is useful despite that, in reality, judicial interpretation is
neither insular nor truly final. We know that the myth is not "true," in
the sense that it is not a sophisticated and comprehensive account
which explains how dialogue and equilibrium unravel claims about in-
terpretive finality. But it is "true" as a baseline political commitment,
and it is capable of promoting support among the governed and of
fostering social solidarity.
I imagine the myth operating something like the relationship be-
tween perceptions of the trial process and jury decision-making. We
treasure our right to jury trials,2"8 and have "faith" in the "system."
Yet we couple this with a set of rules designed to prevent knowledge
of the way juries arrive at decisions.20 9 We know that juries operate in
a manner far from our ideal, but we do not inquire further, for fear of
undermining the legitimacy of the system. So too with constitutional
interpretation. With less-than-rigorous probing we can know that the
judiciary's "authoritative" interpretations are neither insular nor truly
final; but there are virtues to be extracted from the image that courts
have the final say. Therefore, we should preserve the myth, knowing
full well what rests behind it. Abandoning judicial supremacy would
jeopardize the vitality of the myth and invite more frequent crises-
political and constitutional-in resolving interpretive disputes.
At first blush it might seem there is tension between the myth
and the objectives of diffuse interpretive responsibility. One might
ask: if the myth suggests it is for courts to discern the meaning of the
Constitution, why should nonjudicial actors, including citizens, bother
to interpret and convey their views about constitutional meaning?
They should because nonjudicial interpreters have varying degrees of
awareness that judicial interpretation is neither insular nor truly final.
Even partial recognition of the dynamism of the interpretive process
enables some actors to accept active interpretive roles without impair-
ing the utility of the myth (and its legitimating function) as applied to
others. Admittedly, there is the potential the myth would dampen ef-
forts to promote diffuse interpretive responsibility and achieve the full
208. See U.S. CONST. amends. VI, VII.
209. See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 606; Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987).
richness of widespread constitutional debate. But the impact would
not be substantial, and would be outweighed by benefits afforded by
perpetuation of the myth itself.
Similarly, it might appear there is tension between the myth and
efforts to combat cynical positivism. The myth is premised on the idea
that judicial supremacy promotes the legitimacy of the judiciary. Cyn-
ical positivism stems from disenchantment with the idea that judges
get to say what the law is, or what the Constitution means. How can
recast judicial supremacy both promote legitimacy and defend against
cynical positivism?
It can because cynical positivists are not the same people as those
most likely to subscribe to the myth. Recast judicial supremacy
speaks to both groups of people at once. Judicial supremacy's descrip-
tive troika is not easy to comprehend. As suggested, there will be
varying degrees of awareness that judicial interpretations are neither
insular not truly final. For those who care little to, or are unable to,
comprehend the subtleties of the interpretive process, recast judicial
supremacy (including the descriptive troika at its core) looks just like
traditional judicial supremacy, and continues to promote the judici-
ary's legitimacy.
Others will have a more comprehensive understanding of the "re-
alities" of the interpretive process. These people will have either lim-
ited or no use for the myth. Cynical positivists tend to fall in this
category. For them, recast judicial supremacy promises to minimize
their unease with the interpretive process by inviting a diffusion of
interpretive responsibility, and by generally enriching interpretive
discourse.21 o
210. This conception of the myth might appear to have elitist overtones. In this Article
I have emphasized that under judicial supremacy judicial interpretations are neither insular
nor truly final. I have also suggested we should retain the myth because it promotes judi-
cial legitimacy and social solidarity. One might infer that I believe it is beneficial that some
people hold on to the traditional account of judicial supremacy while others (including
those who read articles like this) know the "full truth" about the interpretive process.
Such an inference would be misguided. I do imagine some people will have greater
understanding of the interpretive process than others. But there is nothing inherently valu-
able about some people having partial understandings. I welcome the day when every
government actor's and citizen's view of the interpretive process tracks the descriptive ac-
count of recast judicial supremacy. Under such conditions, the myth would become unnec-
essary. Everyone would plainly understand the complexities and interactivity of the
interpretive process. Whatever legitimacy that process would have would depend on
something other than the sheer simplicity and stability of judicial authoritativeness. (Per-
haps its legitimacy would be based on a normative account like recast judicial supremacy).
The value of the myth is predicated on nothing other than the predictive supposition that
not everyone will achieve heightened comprehension of the interpretive process. The
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C. Departmentalism's Vices and Virtues
1. Taking Stock of Departmentalism
Having recast judicial supremacy, what can be said of depart-
mentalism? As suggested at several points, many legal scholars sub-
scribe partly or fully to an essential claim of departmentalism-that
authoritative interpretive responsibility does not rest with the Court.
But few explicitly identify themselves as "departmentalists. '21' It is
not clear why this is so, although it may reflect a divide between those
academicians schooled as lawyers and those who are trained as polit-
ical scientists; the terminology of departmentalism is more closely as-
sociated with the latter group.212 Nevertheless, resistance to judicial
supremacy, on normative and descriptive grounds, is well represented
in contemporary legal writings, and the alternatives offered by critics
of judicial supremacy primarily take the form of accounts advancing
coordinacy, or the equal standing of branches of the government as
interpretive agents.
The insights of departmentalists, and the criticisms of judicial
supremacy leveled by them, ought not be dismissed. They illuminate
ways in which traditional notions of judicial supremacy are inade-
quate. Yet instead of counseling that judicial supremacy should be
discarded altogether as a descriptive model or normative ideal, the
contributions of departmentalists advance efforts to reconceptualize
judicial supremacy.
Indeed, departmentalists' observations about nonjudicial inter-
pretation are instructive. They demonstrate that constitutional inter-
pretation is an interactive process. But the fact that interpretation
takes place outside the judiciary does not require a repudiation of ju-
dicial supremacy. As I will argue in the next subpart, discussing the
political question doctrine and modern Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence, even the most direct examples of judicial deference to the in-
myth is of enduring use because it speaks to those people with less-than-full appreciation
of judicial supremacy's descriptive troika and promotes legitimacy and solidarity in a man-
ner nonjudicial supremacist accounts are incapable of doing.
211. Of course, agreeing that authoritative interpretive responsibility does not rest with
courts is not enough to qualify one as a departmentalist. See supra note 220.
212. Murphy and Burgess, for example, are political scientists. Interestingly, one com-
mentator accused Paulsen of overlooking political science literature in his treatment of
prior scholarship on interpretive authority. See Eisgruber, supra note 9, at 353 n.24. In his
article, Eisgruber acknowledges his debt to political scientist Jeffrey Tilis, whose work in-
fluenced Eisgruber's thinking on this topic. See id. See generally THE PRESIDENCY IN THE
CONSTrI-UTIONAL ORDER (Joseph M. Bessette & Jeffrey K. Tulis eds., 1980); JEFFREY K.
TULIS, THE RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY (1987).
terpretive views of other branches do not amount to an undoing of
judicial supremacy as a descriptive account.
As for the normative claims of departmentalists, or those sympa-
thetic with their projects, here again their views are important and
useful, but ultimately unpersuasive. While it is extremely difficult to
bring the array of claims raised by departmentalists under general
headings, it strikes me that departmentalism is designed as an antidote
to five perceived flaws of judicial supremacy as a model governing the
interpretive process. These problems are that: (1) interpretation is
too important to be left to a single branch, and therefore judicial
supremacy is procedurally deficient; (2) single branch interpretation
produces inadequate substantive results-that there is a need for
more voices to yield the best results; (3) other branches need to inter-
pret in order to carry out their responsibilities; (4) judicial supremacy
contravenes some substantive principles or commitments, like democ-
racy or equality; and (5) judicial supremacy squashes broad-based
awareness of, and commitment to, constitutional principles.
Redressing these concerns is a worthwhile objective. But these
problems can be remedied without departmentalism. Departmental-
ists discount the virtues of judicial authoritativeness. Many critics of
judicial supremacy also seem trapped in a binary analysis. They per-
ceive complete abandonment of judicial supremacy as the only alter-
native to the rigid formalism it is supposed to represent.213 And they
appear unable to contemplate how textured and nuanced judicial
supremacy can be, and unwilling to confront the full implications and
potential risks presented by the views they espouse.
The failure to realize that the benefits of departmentalism can be
harvested while avoiding the many dangers presented by depart-
mentalist alternatives is one of their principal defects in the depart-
mentalist accounts discussed here. Another is their indeterminacy.
They refuse to acknowledge the havoc wrought by departmentalism,
or explain sufficiently how such chaos is to be avoided.
Take Burt for instance. His project is geared toward fostering an
augmented form of dialogue. Unlike many other departmentalists, he
offers some particular prescriptions for how to proceed in a world
without judicial supremacy. These, however, tend to focus on how the
213. Eisgruber's theory of comparative institutional competence appears to be an ex-
ception. See Eisgruber, supra note 9. Yet his account is plagued by the same kind of dan-
gerous indeterminacy characterizing other forms of departmentalism. Because we do not
know how interpretive authority is allocated, or when we are presented with the rare occa-
sions when disobedience of a judicial mandate is permitted, we are left with layer upon
layer of uncertainty and lose the benefits afforded by judicial supremacy.
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Court should restrain its involvement, rather than explaining how
other actors are to understand and execute their own roles in a refash-
ioned interpretive process. In addition, many of the advantages of his
interpretive vision are realizable without adopting the model he advo-
cates, or accepting his contentions and notions of what constitutes
equality and coercion.
Burgess's project appears aimed primarily at meeting two objec-
tives: fostering interbranch communication and exchanges, and secur-
ing deepened sensitivity to, and awareness of, constitutional questions.
These are meritorious aspirations. Nevertheless, her particular ac-
count of departmentalism is not instructive for government actors, for
it does not tell us when departments should interpret, or what effect, if
any, is to be given judicial decisions.214 Nor does it explain what to do
in the event a true clash develops between branches regarding
interpretation.
Fisher, like Burgess, offers a rich descriptive account of nonjudi-
cial interpretation. He has effectively detailed many of the ways in
which the executive and Congress play important and sustained roles
in the interpretive process. Ultimately, however, he seems to avoid
many of the hard questions left unanswered by his survey.215 Near the
conclusion of Constitutional Dialogues he asks, in light of all he has
said, what qualifications should be placed on the "last word" doc-
trine?2 16 Notwithstanding his proclamation that "we cannot permit
judicial power and constitutional interpretation to reside only in the
courts[,]" his more specific responses evince little willingness to resist
court judgments, and offer no guidance as to how, in particular, we
ought to understand the relationship of the departments in the inter-
217pretive process.
As for Paulsen, he is right in insisting the Constitution is too im-
portant to stifle debate over its meaning, and in suggesting the need
for the political branches to engage in some interpretation in carrying
out their constitutional duties. But his approach is exceedingly rooted
in formalism2 s1 and ignores the prospect that judicial supremacy can
214. Does she, for instance, authorize nonacquiescence with court decisions?
215. Fisher says so little about the limits of his arguments against judicial interpretation
that I find myself uncertain whether it is appropriate to classify him as a departmentalist.
216. FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES, supra note 161, at 278.
217. Id. at 278-79.
218. Paulsen is led astray, I think, by overreliance on "logic." He speaks of following
the "logic" of the Founders' premises, of the "logic" of Marbury, and calls his method
"Euclidean." He states "[t]he argument I have presented in this Article is in the nature of
a logical proof-a syllogism." Paulsen, Executive Power, supra note 9, at 343. Law, how-
ever, is not, and never will be, math. Cf. Eisgruber, supra note 9 ("Paulsen is overly fond
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retain the view that the judiciary is the ultimate interpreter and also
recognize that, other than in the immediate short-term, the judiciary is
not in any important respect alone in deciding what the Constitution
means.
In fact, Paulsen's approach is precisely the reverse of my own: he
argues for executive review-within a broader departmentalist frame-
work-but explains why our system looks like judicial supremacy.21 9
I, on the other hand, explain that our system is best described by a
recast account of judicial supremacy but at times appears to conform
with a departmentalist account.
2. What Departmentalists Forgot: The People's Constitution
Because departmentalism is a theory about the interpretive au-
thority of the branches of the federal government, it does not obvi-
ously speak to the potential role of citizen interpreters.
Departmentalist accounts rarely dedicate attention to the role citizen
interpretation ought to play, if it is to have any role at all. Writing in
response to Paulsen, Levinson presses this very point:
Perhaps one would argue that the citizens' role is simply to ac-
cept.., the decisions made by some institutional body, whether
Congress, the Court, or the President. Although this might ac-
curately capture the way most people would describe their (non-) role as constitutional interpreters, it is nonetheless highly
problematic, especially if one takes the premises of constitu-
tional supremacy seriously.220
of quasi-mathematical forms of constitutional argument."); Rosenfeld, supra note 168, at
143 (suggesting the limitations of Paulsen's use of logic in an earlier article); Tribe, Reflec-
tions on Free-Form Method, supra note 18, at 1224 n.4.
219. The "executive restraint" Paulsen urges would operate so that our system contin-
ued to look much like a model of judicial supremacy. As he explains, "It may be... the
primary value of my thesis is to offer an alternative descriptive model of the way the system
of separation of powers, over time, produces results that resemble judicial supremacy, even
though a model of judicial supremacy is formally contrary to the original constitutional
vision." Paulsen, Executive Power, supra note 9, at 343.
220. Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Protestantism in Theory and Practice: Two Ques-
tions for Michael Stokes Paulsen and One for His Critics, 83 GEo. L.J. 373, 375-76 (1994).
Levinson reads Paulsen's arguments about interpretive authority as "correctly anchored in
a basic notion of constitutional supremacy-that the Constitution, however defined, sets
boundaries to, and thus in some way takes priority over, acts of ordinary public officials
that are incompatible with it." Id. at 373. Levinson is a "constitutional protestant"; he
believes in the legitimacy of "individualized (or at least nonhierarchical, communal) inter-
pretation." Id at 373 n.1; see also LEVINSON, supra note 94. Although an examination of
constitutional protestantism is beyond the scope of this paper, it warrants noting that while
departmentalism and protestantism share important features, they are not identical ac-
counts of interpretive authority. In responding to Paulsen, Levinson never refers to
"departmentalism." In a reply to Levinson's response, Paulsen admits to being a protes-
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Paulsen's response flows directly from the methodological ap-
proach of his article. His argument for the executive's independent
interpretive power is rooted in the Constitution's structure and its
oath clauses. "Logically, these same arguments, if valid, apply to all
persons who exercise some degree of governmental power under our
Constitution and (overlapping this category) all those who swear an
oath to uphold the Constitution."'" From this he concludes that "all
citizens (each of whom possesses a tiny amount of governmental
power under our Constitution) have independent interpretive power
within their (tiny) spheres of governmental power. 222
Other departmentalists who decry the supposed interpretive he-
gemony of judicial supremacy hint that one of judicial supremacy's
failings is its exclusion of citizen interpretation. Burgess presents a
typical view about the supposed effect of judicial supremacy: "It is
unclear how the public's role in the process of interpretation will be
maintained (or why the public should remain interested in interpreta-
tion) in the context of judicial supremacy. ''1 3 Murphy also gestures
toward the problem, reminding us that in its Preamble the Constitu-
tion lodges responsibility for itself in "the people."224 Notwithstand-
ing these musings, it is difficult to imagine nongovernmental actors
would play an important interpretive function under any depart-
mentalist scheme.
What is the role of citizens under recast judicial supremacy? To
this point, I have focused on the interpretive roles to be played by the
departments of the federal government. This should not suggest, how-
ever, that citizens would play an unimportant role under recast judi-
cial supremacy. 25
Under our current interpretive scheme, over time citizens affect
constitutional meaning. But the role of citizens today is a pale version
of what it ought to be. An important component in the diffusion of
interpretive responsibility inherent in the account of recast judicial
supremacy outlined here is a commitment to the ideal of the citizen-
tant to some degree or other, but maintains he is a departmentalist. Indeed, Paulsen ap-
pears to believe (or hope) that Levinson too is a departmentalist. See Paulsen, Reply to
Professors Levinson and Eisgruber, supra note 7, at 393 (exclaiming that he, Levinson, and
Eisgruber are "all ... departmentalists now!").
221. Paulsen, Reply to Professors Levinson and Eisgruber, supra note 7, at 386.
222. Id.
223. BURGESS, supra note 10, at 9.
224. See Murphy, Who Shall Interpret?, supra note 5, at 402.
225. Nor should it suggest that there are not important questions to be asked about the
relationship of state officials to the interpretations rendered by the federal courts. See
infra Part IV.C.
interpreter." 6 As John Finn has explained in advocating improve-
ments in "constitutional literacy," we must foster understanding of
"the values and normative commitments that inform constitutional
government," for the perpetuation of constitutional values requires a
particular conception of citizenship which serves as a foundation for
both political authority and political obligation. 27
The vision of an engaged, and constitutionally "literate" populace
can be realized without abandoning judicial supremacy.228 Joseph
Goldstein has remarked that the Constitution is for the People, and
debate and judgments about its meaning must always be as accessible
to the citizenry as is possible. 29 This is surely so, and is reflected in
the mandate many judges impose upon themselves to make their
opinions as readable, and nontechnical, as possible.2" Recast judicial
supremacy goes further, however, and insists that through the
processes of dialogue and equilibrium citizens can actually develop,
and act upon, their own constitutional judgments.2 3' Citizen partici-
pation is needed not only on the rare occasions when constitutional
amendments are pending, or even during the "moments" when funda-
mental constitutional change arises outside of the amendment pro-
cess .3 2  Rather, our union will be made "more perfect," our
constitutional judgments will be infused with legitimacy, and our col-
lective commitment to living by constitutional principles will be deep-
226. In addition to the writings discussed below, some recent explorations of the role of
citizens in the processes of constitutional adjudication and interpretation include SUN-
STEIN, supra note 18, Robin West, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism, 88
MicHi. L. REv. 641 (1990), and Frank Michelman, ForeworcL- Traces of Self-Government,
100 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1986).
227. John E. Finn, Defining Constitutional Literacy, Address Before Wesleyan Univer-
sity Board of Trustees (Jan. 26, 1991), in WESLEYAN UNIV. CAMPUS REP., Feb. 21, 1991, at
8.
228. In fact, as argued earlier, a diffusion of interpretive responsibility promotes com-
mitments to constitutional principles by encouraging citizens to engage the Constitution
and become enriched by the values and ideas it embodies. See supra Part III.A.2.
229. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 10, at 7 ("Our justices on the Court must never forget
that the Constitution, which they expound, emanated from Us, was meant to remain com-
prehensible to Us, and was established for Our Posterity to endure and to be modified with
Our informed consent.").
230. Cf. Edward R. Becker, In Praise of Footnotes, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (1996) (discuss-
ing the issue as it relates to the use of footnotes in judicial opinions).
231. Examples of how they might do so include voting so as to effectuate their views,
involvement in the appointment process, see infra note 243, and constitutional
conventions.
232. See ACKERMAN, WE TE PEOPLE, supra note 96 (discussing constitutional "mo-
ments" and higher lawmaking by "the People").
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ened, with persistent involvement of citizens in infusing the
Constitution with meaning.
Of course, not all citizen-interpretation of the Constitution is, or
would be, thoughtful or useful. Some of it is downright silly.3 3 The
quality of citizen-interpretation will vary widely. But valuable contri-
butions to our constitutional discourse can arise from sources other
than public officials and constitutional law professors. It would be un-
wise for any normative account of who interprets to exclude citizens.
Citizen interpretation already takes place, 4 and always will take
place. But it is not encouraged, and has no routinized mechanism for
expression. Were citizen interpretation more welcome it would be-
come more disciplined and directed, and could only enhance our con-
stitutional discourse.
Under recast judicial supremacy citizens are not inferior inter-
preters. Like other nonjudicial actors, in the short-term their views
are not authoritative. But their interpretive contributions are always
valuable as dialogic input, and over time they are central to shaping
the Constitution's meaning.
Not surprisingly, some commentators express little or no enthusi-
asm for citizen interpretation. For instance, Jed Rubenfeld cautions
us about the tension between democracy and constitutionalism,2 35 and
forcefully argues against the perspective that "the final arbiter of con-
stitutional meaning should be the people itself. '2 36 He is chiefly con-
cerned about the possibility authoritative citizen interpretation would
undermine the notion the Constitution is an enduring document which
233. One need only peruse the Internet to find examples of what I consider quite bi-
zarre readings of the Constitution. There are Constitution web-sites on the Internet, but
most of the information I found in those had nothing to do with the Constitution. See, e.g.,
<http://www. constitution.org>. Not surprisingly, most of the "constitutional dialogue" I
came across while browsing the Internet one afternoon in July 1996 concerned the Second
Amendment. Notwithstanding the disappointing results of my search, it strikes me the
Internet is an ideal forum for citizen dialogue about the Constitution.
234. It is manifest in various forms. Recent confirmations battles over Supreme Court
nominees reflect the influence of citizen interpretation. See infra note 243. Another less
publicized example is the Libertarian Party's criticism of the Supreme Court's jurispru-
dence on forfeiture. At their 1996 political convention, much attention was directed to-
ward the issue, including a decision reached during the 1995 Term, Bennis v. Michigan, 116
S. Ct. 994 (1996). See, e.g., James Bovard, Address at the Libertarian Party U.S. Presiden-
tial Nominating Convention (July 4, 1996).
235. For other discussions of the relationship between democracy and constitutional-
ism, see Walter F. Murphy, Civil Law, Common Law, and Constitutional Democracy, 52
LA. L. REv. 91 (1991); AGRESTO, supra note 10, at 167; CONST=ItUONALISM AND DEMOC-
RAcy (Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad eds., 1988).
236. Rubenfeld, supra note 13, at 1167.
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reflects commitments beyond the moment and is beyond the reach of
the impulses of the masses at any given time. As he explains:
[T]he great advantage of a constitutional commitment... is the
ability to institutionalize the interpretive power: to delegate this
power to a body of persons designed to be neither a proxy for
the people as a whole, nor vested with the political power that is
chiefly to be restrained, nor reliant on majority will.2"7
Rubenfeld argues against citizens as final interpreters. While citi-
zens do not occupy this role under recast judicial supremacy, we
should take seriously his concern about the relationship between citi-
zen interpretation and the Constitution's safeguards against majoritar-
ianism. But Rubenfeld appears to underestimate the dynamism of the
interactive process which influences interpretation, even within the ju-
diciary. Neither citizen engagement about constitutional meaning,
nor treating citizens' interpretations as valuable, would expose the
Constitution to the whims of the masses. Instead, citizens' interpreta-
tions would contribute to an enriched dialogue about constitutional
meaning, without threatening to render the Constitution an instru-
ment of sheer majority rule.
Unlike Rubenfeld, there are those who worry the role of citizens
as interpretive agents is vastly too diminished today. Richard Parker
has explicated a brief but powerful account of American democracy,
which maintains that constitutional law should be understood, con-
trary to conventional wisdom, as designed to promote majority rule
rather than limit it.38 For Parker the notion that constitutional law is
higher law, or "better" than law made by ordinary people, is "grandi-
ose puffing." 39 Such "puffing," he worries, comes at the expense of
"ordinary political energy"-the energy of ordinary people as political
actors-and is characteristic of prevailing antipopulist sensibilities.
Parker calls for the development of populist sensibilities, whereby
individuals would be "enabled" and "encouraged" to take part in
political life,240 while, as a corollary, government would become sys-
tematically responsive to ordinary people. Accompanying these
changes would be a revised mission for modem constitutional law-
one which "promote[s] majority rule."24 Accordingly, Parker claims
constitutional interpretation likewise ought to be guided by these
principles.
237. Id.
238. See PARKER, supra note 200, at 4.
239. Id. at 66.
240. Id. at 95.
241. Id. at 96.
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Notwithstanding the enhanced role for citizen-interpreters that
recast judicial supremacy imagines, it is abundantly clear Parker
would find such a model wanting. But Parker overreaches. Much of
the "political energy" he longs for is attainable without radically
reconceptualizing our constitutional culture. As he himself suggests,
in anticipating the charge that his system would "politicize" law and
courts, Presidential elections since at least 1968 have involved a di-
mension of politicized discourse about the course of constitutional
law. Insofar as voters' choices may affect judicial appointments, which
in turn will affect judicial dispositions, "politicization" has already oc-
curred. Not only is this phenomenon "vital to whatever authority in-
heres in the judicial office,"'242 but it demonstrates that citizens can
play an important role in shaping constitutional discourse and inter-
pretation by this and other means. 243 We need not follow Parker to
his radically democratic ideal polity,2 " or accept his supposition that it
is "all right not only to criticize [and] ... condemn constitutional argu-
ment enforced by judges, but also to disobey it,"2 45 in order to engage
citizens meaningfully in the interpretive dynamic.
D. The Political Question Doctrine and Commerce Clause
Jurisprudence: llustrations of Departmentalism?
As suggested earlier, the descriptive power of judicial supremacy
has been questioned in part because there are occasions when its ap-
pears someone other than the judiciary speaks authoritatively about
the Constitution's meaning. There clearly are plausible arguments to
be made that departmentalism is operative (at least from time to time)
in certain legal domains. Nevertheless, what might appear like
departmentalism is most appropriately understood as recast judicial
supremacy.
242. Id. at 111-12.
243. Perhaps this was best illustrated by the Bork nomination hearings, which,
whatever their shortcomings, were, I believe, a somewhat healthy manifestation of the citi-
zen-interpreter ideal. Cf. NAGEL, supra note 196, at 5 ("Bork's confirmation hearings
[were] ... an imperfect but legitimate effort by the larger political culture to influence the
direction of constitutional interpretation."); Wilson, supra note 196, at 1040 (examining the
Bork and Ginsburg nomination hearings, and asserting that "[p]ublic opinion can either
expand or contract important constitutional rights").
244. Given Parker's views, it is not surprising that he sees no tension between democ-
racy and constitutionalism. At the conclusion of his book he asserts: "[T]here are constitu-
tions... [b]ut there is no constitutionalism." PARKER, supra note 200, at 115; cf. sources
cited supra note 235.
245. PARKER, supra note 200, at 111.
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This section discusses two important doctrinal areas which, at first
glance, seem to illustrate departmentalism at work: the political ques-
tion doctrine and modem Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Yet ex-
amination reveals the interpretive activities in these domains conform
with judicial supremacy rather than with a departmentalist paradigm.
1. The Political Question Doctrine
The political question doctrine describes the circumstances where
the Court has stated that constitutional interpretation in particular ar-
eas should be left to the political branches of government-Congress
and the executive.2 46 This doctrine too can be traced back to Mar-
bury,247 but it has only been fully articulated in recent decades.248 To-
day, the issues covered by the political question doctrine include the
conduct of foreign affairs, the regulation of internal congressional
processes, disputes seeking deliberation about the meaning of the
"Guarantee Clause,"249 and arguably, the constitutional amendment
process. The effect of the doctrine, along with other justiciability doc-
trines,"' is that "there are many parts of the Constitution ... the
Court refuses to interpret. 251
Chemerinsky declares that the effect of the political question doc-
trine is, what I have called, "fixed departmentalism"-for each part of
the Constitution there is a final arbiter, but the arbiter is not the same
branch for all matters or constitutional provisions. 2  Is this assertion
correct?
It strikes me this is not correct. Instead, the political question
doctrine is best understood as a voluntary allocation of interpretive
responsibility by the Court to the political branches. This contention
appears supported, at the very least, by the fact that it is the Court
itself which has developed the doctrine. In addition, the Court is con-
246. See generally CHEMERIN sKY, FEDERAL JURISDICION, supra note 85, § 2.6.1, at
142-45.
247. 5 U.S (1 Cranch) at 165-70.
248. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (stating the criteria used in determining
whether or not the political questions test is satisfied); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486
(1969).
249. "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a republican form
of government." U.S. CONsr. art. IV, § 4.
250. Such as that governing "generalized grievances." See CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRET-
lnG THE CONSTITtTON, supra note 15, at 97-98.
251. Id. at 97.
252. See id. at 84; see also Eisgruber, supra note 9, at 355-57 (describing some "political
questions" as "exceptions to judicial supremacy"); Murphy, Who Shall Interpret?, supra
note 5, at 414 (suggesting the doctrine "makes sense in this context").
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tinually asked to re-examine the same matters it already deemed
political questions, and presumably the Court can assert jurisdiction
over such matters at any moment.
Commentators who criticize the political question doctrine on
normative grounds complain that it confuses deference with abdica-
tion.5 They argue that issues generally covered by the doctrine
ought not to be swept away with broad strokes as nonjusticiable. In-
stead, they propose that cases be parsed, and those areas raising con-
stitutional questions come before the Court, while issues relating to
the exercise of truly discretionary power should not. 1 4 These critics
are right to focus on "deference," and may be correct when insisting
the Court has ceded too much ground to the political branches than is
good for the polity. Yet, that the political branches are engaging in
some constitutional interpretation does not establish that the political
question doctrine is an example of departmentalism at work, for re-
cast judicial supremacy abhors judicial exclusivity in interpretation.
That courts should want to defer to the political branches, and
under certain circumstances go so far as to allocate virtually all inter-
pretive tasks to them, on a voluntary basis and for an indefinite pe-
riod, should not surprise even those who would invoke the political
question doctrine as evidence of departmentalism at work. As
Chemerinsky himself recognizes, "courts must preserve their legiti-
macy by avoiding involvement in controversies that will risk the
courts' political capital." 5 The kinds of issues now described as
"political questions" are precisely those which would most embroil the
courts in endeavors which can only corrode the legitimacy which the
army-less, purse-less Court so desperately needs.
2. Modern Commerce Clause Jurisprudence
Modem Commerce Clause jurisprudence 256 also lends itself to a
departmentalist account. Until April 1995, the Court left the bulk of
constitutional interpretation related to the Commerce Clause to Con-
gress. Under Article I, Section 8, Congress has the authority to "regu-
late Commerce . . . among the several states." The scope of
Congress's power under the Commerce Clause was first explored by
253. See, eg., CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICrION, supra note 85, § 2.6.2, at 148;
Louis Henkin, Is There a 'Political Question' Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976).
254. See CHEMERrNSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSTrrUT1oN, supra note 15, at 101-02.
255. Id. at 104-05 (footnote omitted).
256. This discussion addresses only that aspect of the Commerce Clause which is a
source of affirmative congressional regulatory power, not the "dormant Commerce
Clause," which implicitly limits state legislative power.
the Court in Gibbons v. Ogden.57 In Ogden the Court accepted the
notion Congress should enjoy far-reaching power under the Com-
merce Clause-that Congress could legislate regarding all commerce
which concerns more than one state, and that its power would be ple-
nary, limited only by the Constitution's affirmative prohibitions on the
exercise of federal power. 58 From the time of Ogden until the pas-
sage of the Interstate Commerce Act and the Sherman Act, in 1887
and 1890 respectively, the Court was rarely involved in review of con-
gressional actions undertaken pursuant to the Commerce Clause. 59
Between 1887 and 1937, Commerce Clause cases were more fre-
quently before the Court, which struck down a number of statutes as
unauthorized by the Clause.26 ° During this period, the Court imposed
a classification scheme which delineated types of economic activity,
limiting the meaning of "commerce," and consequently of Congress's
power to regulate under the Commerce Clause.
The 1937 decision NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.261
marked a turning point in Commerce Clause jurisprudence. The
Court abandoned the formal approach it had adopted in the previous
period, and instead adopted a flexible, empirical approach, which in-
quired broadly about the effects on interstate commerce. From 1937
to 1995, the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence featured virtual
acquiescence to the judgments of Congress about whether a particular
exercise of power fell within the parameters of Article I, Section 8.262
Undisputedly, after Jones & Laughlin the Court "exercised little in-
dependent judgment, choosing instead to defer to the express or im-
plied findings of Congress to the effect that regulated activities have
the requisite 'substantial economic effect."1263 So long as Congress's
"findings" could be deemed supportable by some rational basis, Con-
gress's view, and its statute, were upheld.' 6 Even the one case be-
257. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
258. See Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 194, 196.
259. See TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 30, § 5-4, at 306-07.
260. See id. at 308; CHEMERrNSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSTrrUTION, supra note 15, at
131-32.
261. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
262. Notwithstanding the importance of Jones & Laughlin itself as demarcation of a
new era in Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the transformation of the doctrine was a pro-
cess, resulting in a dramatic change in the widely held view of the scope and meaning of the
Commerce Clause. Cf. LEVINSON, supra note 94, at 428 (stating that the doctrine was
"radically transformed without formal amendment ever being deemed necessary").
263. TRIBE, supra note 30, § 5-4, at 309.
264. See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min. & Red. Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981). More-
over, after 1937 the commerce power was extended under the "cumulative effect principle"
and the "protective principle" to cover respectively acts which alone would not have sub-
Winter 19971 JUDICIAL SUPREMACY
416 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 24:359
tween 1937 and 1995 striking down congressional action as
unauthorized under the Commerce Clause265 has been explained by
one commentator as primarily a "cue" from the Court to Congress
that it has a burden to judge its "own actions to see if they conform to
the limits and restraints placed on them by the Constitution. 266
Arguably, Commerce Clause jurisprudence again changed course
in 1995 with the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Lo-
pez.267 Lopez presented the question whether the Commerce Clause
empowered Congress to enact the portion of the "Gun Free School
Zones Act," which made it a federal crime to possess a firearm in or
within 1000 feet of a school. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit found the Act unconstitutional. While recognizing
Congress's substantial powers under the Commerce Clause, including
its authority to regulate purely intrastate activity, the Court concluded
"there is nothing to indicate that Congress itself consciously fixed, as
opposed to simply disregarded, the boundary line between the com-
merce power and the reserved power of the states. ' 268 In essence, the
Fifth Circuit seemed disturbed that Congress had failed to engage in
any kind of fact-finding or reflection about the relationship of the acts
covered by the statute to interstate commerce.269
The Supreme Court affirmed by a five to four vote. Marking the
most dramatic shift in the direction of Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence in nearly a half century, the Court determined that Congress
had exceeded its powers under the Commerce Clause. Chief Justice
Rehnquist, writing the opinion of the Court, explained the contested
statute is one which "by its terms has nothing to do with 'commerce'
or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define
those terms.""27 The Court reached this conclusion by measuring
Congress's action against the principle that, aside from regulating the
use of channels of interstate commerce and protecting the instrumen-
talities of interstate commerce, Congress's power to regulate under
the Commerce Clause is limited to activities that "substantially affect"
stantial economic effects and legislation which imposes conditions for the privilege of par-
taking in interstate commerce. See TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrTIONAL LAW, supra note
30, §§ 5-5 to 5-6, at 310-13.
265. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). Usery was effectively
overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
266. PHILIP BOBBrr, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 192 (1982).
267. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
268. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1363 (5th Cir. 1993).
269. Cf. Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 161, at 722-25 (discussing the
role of legislative "facts" in constitutional law).
270. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630-31.
interstate commerce.271 Four dissenting Justices challenged the wis-
dom of the Court's approach, with Justice Souter calling it a "back-
ward glance at... old pitfalls. 272
Federal courts273 and commentators274 have begun to interpret
Lopez and discern the new character of Congress's powers under the
Commerce Clause. 75 But the first version of this Article was written
while Lopez was pending before the Supreme Court. At that time I
contended post-1937 Commerce Clause jurisprudence, like the polit-
ical question doctrine, has been characterized by an effective volun-
tary allocation by the Court to Congress of the responsibility for
interpreting the meaning and application of Article I, Section 8.
While it is too soon to assess the full character of the change in Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence Lopez has effected, in my view Lopez
does nothing to counter this description of modern Commerce Clause
jurisprudence.
Indeed, judicial involvement in Commerce Clause adjudication
does not threaten the Court's legitimacy in the way adjudicating polit-
ical question cases might. Not surprisingly then, in Commerce Clause
cases the Court's deference, or voluntary allocation, has been less cat-
egorical, and more subject to change over time, than in political ques-
tion cases. Lopez can be read as a reflection of the dissatisfaction of a
majority of the Court with Congress's handling of its interpretive re-
sponsibility vis-a-vis the commerce power. This dissatisfaction led the
Court to retract some of the deference it had extended to Congress
during the preceding forty-eight years. The Court, it seems, deter-
mined that Congress has partly defaulted in executing its task to assess
271. Id. at 1630.
272. Id at 1653.
273. Since Lopez, numerous claims have been brought challenging the constitutionality
of federal legislation. These cases are working their way through the federal courts. This
Term, the Supreme Court heard arguments in a case which asks whether Congress ex-
ceeded its Commerce Clause powers in passing part of the Brady Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 922
(Supp. 1997). See Printz v. United States, 66 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 1995), cert granted, 116 S.
Ct. 2521 (1996) (No. 95-1478) (argued Dec. 3, 1996); see also United States v. Michael R.,
90 F.3d 340 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding law barring juvenile possession of handguns).
274. See, e.g., Raoul Berger, Judicial Manipulation of the Commerce Clause, 74 TEX. L.
REv. 695 (1996); Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated Pow-
ers". In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MIcH. L. REv. 752 (1995); Richard A. Ep-
stein, Constitutional Faith and the Commerce Clause, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 167 (1996);
Louis H. Pollak, Foreword- Reflections on Lopez, 94 Mic. L. Rnv. 533 (1995); see also
Mark Tshnet, Living in a Constitutional Moment: Lopez and Constitutional Theory, 46
CASE W. RES. L. Rv. 845 (1996) (exploring the idea that Lopez marks a "constitutional
moment" of the sort described in Part H.B).
275. A detailed assessment of Lopez is beyond the scope of this Article.
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responsibly its own authority under the Commerce Clause. Moreover,
Congress's failure to include in the legislation any findings about the
relationship between the statute and interstate commerce appeared a
kind of flaunting of its-free reign under the commerce power,276 which
invited the Court to reprimand the legislature and remind it of its
responsibilities. 277
Prior to Lopez, it appeared the only limitation on Congress's
commerce power was that imposed by other provisions of the Consti-
tution,278 and by the internal political restraints of the legislative pro-
cess itself.2 79 The Court's permissiveness can be explained by recast
judicial supremacy, which embraces widespread diffusion of interpre-
tive responsibility and allows the judiciary to allocate interpretive
tasks when deemed useful or necessary.280 Lopez reinforces rather
than refutes this notion. Indeed, with Lopez the Court has sent the
message that if federal courts are to continue to allocate interpretive
responsibility to Congress, then that body must act more reflectively
and conscientiously as an independent constitutional interpreter.
IV. The Relevance and Utility of the
"Who Interprets" Inquiry
This Part of the Article examines a number of issues which have
received political and media attention during recent years, and which
implicate nonjudicial interpretation of the Constitution. The first sub-
part discusses Congress's role as a constitutional interpreter, in gen-
eral, as well as in connection with two legislative initiatives-the Line
Item Veto Act and the Defense of Marriage Act. The second subpart
addresses "judicial independence," and considers how we might think
about the boundaries between legitimate criticism of judges and unde-
276. Some commentators, however, doubt that Lopez will limit Congress's apparent
unrestrained authority under the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., Henry Monaghan, We the
People[s], Original Understanding, and Constitutional Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. REv.
121, 177 (1996) ("Despite [Lopez] ... it remains clear that virtually all desired political,
social, and economic change can be achieved through ordinary legislation at the national
level.").
277. It is interesting to note that a bill has been introduced in the House of Representa-
tives to require Congress to specify the source of its authority under the Constitution for
each law it seeks to enact. See H.R. 2270, 104th Cong. (1995) (introduced by Congressman
Shadegg).
278. This includes, arguably, principles of federalism. See Nagel, Federalism as a Fun-
damental Value: National League of Cities in Perspective, 1981 Sup. Or. REv. 81.
279. See TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrrUTIONAL LAW, supra note 30, § 5-7, at 313-16.
280. Cf. Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 161, at 715-16 ("Congressional
interpretations are given substantial weight in some circumstances, even to the point of
becoming the controlling factor.") (footnote omitted).
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sirable impingement on the operation of the judiciary. The third sub-
part looks to Proposition 187, a 1994 California ballot initiative.
Without delving into the substance of that issue, the discussion of
Proposition 187 sets out a number of important questions related to
any inquiry about who interprets. In addition, Proposition 187 pro-
vides an occasion to revisit the interpretive role of citizens and con-
sider the place of state officials in an interpretive scheme.
Discussion of these topics should illustrate the far-reaching rele-
vance of the "who interprets" question, and demonstrate that
thoughtful consideration of the question facilitates productive deliber-
ation about the substance of the disputed "political" issues to which
they are related.
A. Congress as a Constitutional Interpreter
Congress must have authority under some constitutional provi-
sion to pass a law.28 ' Therefore, every legislative act Congress under-
takes raises (or should raise) at least one, and perhaps several,
constitutional questions. At times, Congress makes no mention in its
reports, or in actual legislation, of the constitutional authority under
which it proposes laws. And it often pays little attention to constitu-
tional questions related to the passage of ordinary legislation, usually
adopted pursuant to Article I, Section 8.21 According to Paul Brest's
research, in "the late eighteenth century and throughout much of the
nineteenth century, the entire Congress often debated constitutional
issues. ' s3 This practice waned over time, however, and during the
nineteenth and into the twentieth century, such debates were rele-
gated to the judiciary committees, and then left principally to the
courts .2 8
On many occasions today when robust constitutional debate on
the floors of Congress is warranted few or no such exchanges occur.
A great many legislators demonstrate little knowledge of, or interest
in, constitutional questions or the relevance of the Constitution to
their work. This trend is worsened by the fact that members of Con-
281. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I.
282. See Paul Brest, Congress as Constitutional Decisionmaker and Its Power to Counter
Judicial Doctrine, 21 GA. L. Rv. 57, 59 (1986) ('Congress has not regularly dealt with
these ordinary constitutional issues in a responsible manner.").
283. Id. at 83.
284. See id. at 85. For a discussion of the extent to which constitutional issues were
debated in relation to some major pieces of legislation between 1954 and 1985, see id. at
85-93.
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gress fail to engage their constituents about the meaning and signifi-
cance of the Constitution.
Why has serious evaluation of the Constitution's relevance to
proposed legislation diminished as a congressional practice? Brest
suggests that, at least in the early stages of this development, the
growth and complexity of constitutional doctrine, as well as increasing
demands on individual legislators, probably contributed.-8 5 Abner
Mikva, who served as both a congressman and a federal judge, 286
identifies a number of factors-institutional and political-which con-
tribute to the paucity of constitutional dialogue in Congress. s7 Also
figuring in "Congress' mixed performance is . . . the fact that its
proper role in making constitutional judgments has never been firmly
defined.' ' 28 8 That it has never been properly defined appears partly
the result of an unreflecting embrace of traditional judicial supremacy.
Whatever its causes, Mikva is concerned about the dangers asso-
ciated with congressional abstinence. 9 He wants Congress to make
more of an effort to screen legislation for possible constitutional de-
fects, and to clarify its motives to the courts. Such practices might
"provide a different viewpoint on the Constitution and become an in-
novative force.' 29° At its core, Mikva's Congress would engage in in-
terpretation of the Constitution in order to assist courts by being
clearer about its intentions and ideas, and by providing another voice
in a conversation about the meaning of the Constitution. The virtues
advanced by this undertaking would be honesty, clarity, and further-
ance of dialogue. Mikva does not, however, wish to depart from a
plan where courts ultimately have the unfettered capacity to review
the constitutionality of all congressional legislation. Whatever value
might be derived from enhanced congressional deliberation, "it is not
a substitute for the judgment of the courts.''
Brest also has higher aspirations for Congress. In an early article
he expressed hope for the development of "conscientious legislators,"
who will learn how to understand and interpret both the Constitution
285. See id. at 85.
286. Upon leaving the judiciary, Mikva served as White House Counsel.
287. See Mikva, supra note 10, at 609-10.
288. Id. at 587.
289. He identifies two specific dangers. First, by passing questions onto the courts,
Congress diverts political pressure from itself, and invites courts either to respond to public
opinion and political pressure, or face political attack. Second, to the extent the courts
assume some level of congressional deliberation has taken place, courts may reduce the
level of scrutiny they apply to a question requiring interpretive judgment. See id. at 588-89.
290. Id. at 608.
291. Id. at 610.
and court decisions about it.292 At that time Brest had little to say
about the particular tensions or dangers associated with Congress as
an interpreter. Rather, he simply propounded that the legislative view
of what the Constitution means is relevant and important, and wanted
legislators to learn how courts view problems.
His later articles reveal a more comprehensive view about the
role of Congress. Brest's view about the authority of Congress to
counter court decisions is, by his own admission, unusual. For him,
Congress only possesses such authority if it has the capacity to deliber-
ate "well" 293 about the Constitution's meaning. Yet, in his judgment,
Congress woefully lacks this capacity. Its "traditions and practices of
considering constitutional questions" are, he claims, "weak and un-
trustworthy."2 94 Nevertheless, Brest is not without hope. He wishes
for a time when Congress will put in place mechanisms and proce-
dures for thoughtful review of constitutional questions, so that it can
assume a role which, in his eyes, the Constitution itself mandates: in-
terpreting the Constitution.
Indeed, notwithstanding the complexity of constitutional law, the
incredible demands on the time of legislators, and the apparent ab-
sence of political awards, I share Brest's and Mikva's desire to have
Congress engage in more systematic and thoughtful debate about the
bearing of the Constitution on their work as legislators. As a descrip-
tive matter, "at best, Congress does an uneven job of considering the
constitutionality of the statutes it adopts. 2 95 From a normative stand-
point, the quality of constitutional discourse would be enriched were
Congress to adopt an interpretive consciousness of the sort recast ju-
dicial supremacy embraces.2 96 Notwithstanding the fact that Congress
292. Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation,
27 STAN. L. REv. 585 (1975).
293. Throughout this Article, I have assiduously avoided addressing the question "what
counts as interpretation?" While clearly relevant to the issues discussed in this Article, the
query deserves a treatment of its own. However, I must say I am skeptical about efforts to
develop a scheme to segregate genuine or worthwhile interpretations from half-hearted or
stupid ones. My sense is that the interpretive process, as described by recast judicial
supremacy, is itself capable of sorting through all types of "interpretations" and making
use of the ones which are deemed worthwhile by the interpretive process itself. It strikes
me as unnecessary to develop a separate account of what qualifies as an interpretation,
which would cabin weak or disingenuous interpretations and identify them as unfit for
consideration when examining constitutional meaning.
294. Brest, supra note 282, at 103.
295. Mikva, supra note 10, at 587.
296. Fisher, a specialist with the Congressional Research Service at the Library of Con-
gress, would agree with Brest, Mikva, and me that "the interests of constituional [sic] law
and the political process are best served when members of Congress form independent
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has at times performed poorly as an interpreter, a movement toward
more thorough and consistent consideration of constitutional issues
would produce more valuable contributions to the dialogic interpre-
tive process already at work.297
1. The Line Item Veto Act
Congress's treatment of two pieces of legislation with significant
constitutional implications provides useful illustrations of Congress's
experience as an interpreter, and suggests how Congress may improve
as an interpreter. On April 9, 1996, the President signed into law the
Line Item Veto Act.298 Proposals for a "line item veto" have been
introduced with regularity in Congress during the past decade. As a
general matter, a "line item veto" provides a method for the President
to strike out particular parts of legislation approved by the Congress;
it is typically proposed as a method to eliminate specific budget autho-
rizations. Line item veto proposals have taken the form of either a
proposed amendment to the Constitution, 99 or statutory authoriza-
tion for exercise of the "veto. '30 0
Constitutional questions have been raised in connection with the
panoply of line item proposals which have been advanced, including
concerns that a particular veto provision might contravene the "Pre-
sentment Clause,"'30 1 and separation of powers principles. Clearly, a
judgments on constitutional issues." Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 161,
at 743. Fisher nevertheless goes awry in asserting that "the Supreme Court is the 'ultimate
interpreter' only when its decisions have been accepted as reasonable and persuasive by
the people and other governmental units." Id. at 716.
297. It would be reasonable to ask: Why should Congress choose to take on this inter-
pretive role? Members of Congress have no obvious "political" incentive to do so. Yet it
seems to me members of Congress have an obligation to assume this role because they
have taken an oath to "support" the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3. While the
requirements imposed by the Article VI oath are hardly self-evident, at a minimum I take
the oath to mean that Senators and Representatives have a duty to consider independently
the meaning of the Constitution and its connection to their work. Moreover, citizens ought
to provide an incentive for members of Congress to assume a more active interpretive role,
by expecting serious deliberation about the Constitution from their representatives.
298. Pub. L. No. 104-130, 110 Stat. 1200 (1996) (codified as 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 621 (note),
681 (note), 691, 691 (note), 691(a)-(f), 692 (Supp. 1997)).
299. For a discussion of some proposed amendments and evaluation of the effects of
such amendments on the federal balance of power, see Anthony R. Petrilla, The Role of
the Line-Item Veto in the Federal Balance of Power, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 469 (1994).
300. For a useful discussion of some of the major proposals (both statutory and by way
of amendment), see Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General, Testimony Before the
Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on the Constitution, Federalism, and Prop-
erty Rights (January 24, 1995).
301. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
statutory approach raises constitutional worries which are not directly
implicated by a proposed amendment to the Constitution.3°
The Line Item Veto Act became effective on January 1, 1997.
The Act does not confer upon the President a "true" line item veto.
Instead, it gives the President "enhanced rescission authority." Under
the enhanced rescission scheme, the President can selectively elimi-
nate individual spending items in appropriation bills or their re-
ports.30 3 Congress could attempt to nullify the President's item veto
by passing a disapproving bill. But the President could veto that bill,
too.
3 04
Since Congress adopted a line item veto by statute rather than by-
pursuing a constitutional amendment, examination of how members
treated the attendant constitutional questions should provide a useful
illustration of how Congress conceives of its own role as an interpreter
of the Constitution. A few observations about the debate on the
House and Senate floors warrant mention.305 First, considerable at-
tention was dedicated, especially by opponents of the bill, but also by
supporters, to the effect of the proposed legislation on the constitu-
tional principle of separation of powers. Scores of references to the
302. This is not to suggest, however, that debate about the meaning of the "existing"
Constitution is not relevant when considering the virtues of a proposed constitutional
amendment. Indeed, the theoretical possibility of an "unconstitutional" constitutional
amendment is not implausible to me. See Akhil R. Amar, The Consent of the Governed-
Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. Rnv 457, 504 (1994)
("[P]erhaps not everything is properly amendable."); Levinson, supra note 94, at 414-17;
Jeffrey Rosen, Was the Flag Burning Amendment Unconstitutional, 100 YALE L.J. 1073
(1991); cf. Tribe, Amending, supra note 91, at 439, 443 (asserting that the merit of a sug-
gested amendment to the Constitution is committed to judicially unreviewable resolution,
while commenting that the Constitution can be understood as unified by certain underlying
political ideals and fundamental norms which cannot be ignored).
Interestingly, at a question-and-answer period during a visit to Harvard Law School
during the Fall of 1994, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg was asked a question which posited
the possibility that an amendment might violate some existing provision of the Constitu-
tion. She declined to answer the question because of the prospect she might have to decide
such a matter. If the notion of an unconstitutional amendment were beyond the pale of
plausibility, I wonder if she would have responded in a manner like she did.
303. See Robert D. Reischauer, Line-Item Veto Won't Offer Big Bite, WASH. POST, Apr.
17, 1996, at A45 (discussing the Act's provisions).
304. There are further limitations on the President's exercise of the item veto under the
Act. See id.; Bruce Fein, Line Item Frugality... or Fantasy?, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 5,1996, at
A16.
305. Floor debates surely are not the only measure of the extent to which Congress has
reflected on the constitutionality of proposed legislation. Yet floor debates are important,
and particularly so in this case because the precise features of the bills ultimately approved
were unsettled until a fairly late date, and members could not consider the actual legisla-
tion before them until the floor debates occurred. The principal debates over the Line
Item Veto Act occurred on March 27 and March 28, 1996.
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visions and intentions of the Founders, and how these might support
or counsel rejection of the measures before the houses of Congress,
were also made. Fewer direct citations were made to Supreme Court
decisions which would likely be used by a court were it asked to evalu-
ate the constitutionality of the legislation. °6 Personal views were sel-
dom developed in much detail, and oftentimes were displaced by
references to lists of scholars lined up on one side or the other.3 7
Conspicuously sparse in the debates were discussions of Con-
gress's role in addressing the constitutional questions raised. Little
attention was paid to the question, "What self-conception should leg-
islators adopt regarding their responsibility for interpretation of the
Constitution?" One exception, however, was a statement by Senator
Robert Byrd, who expressed the greatest self-consciousness about the
role of the Senate in evaluating the proposed Act. Byrd stated, "We
have, as Senators, a responsibility to make some judgment ourselves
as to the constitutionality of a measure before we pass on it." Ac-
knowledging that "[i]n the final analysis, it will be the courts that will
decide," he nevertheless insisted to his colleagues, "[b]ut we cannot
pass that cup to others. We have to make that judgment here. '308
What interpretive stance should legislators adopt? Is their task
merely one of prediction, like Holmes's "bad man" 30 9 who worries
foremost about whether his actions will be permitted or punished?
Should members of Congress try to imitate courts by acting as if they
are judges? Or should legislators exercise judgment independent of
considerations about what courts have done, or might do in the fu-
ture? Senator Byrd's view seems a mixture of sentiments. He recog-
306. For instance, a search of the Congressional Record reveals that during 1996 the
debates and statements of members concerning the line item veto included only the follow-
ing references: six to Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919
(1983) (finding one house "legislative veto" unconstitutional), none to Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (upholding Congress's delegation to U.S. Sentencing Commis-
sion), and one to Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (invalidating Congress's delegation
of budgetary responsibility to the Controller General under the Gramm-Rudman Act).
These cases are three of the more important modern "separation of powers" cases. Cf.
Mikva, supra note 10, at 609 ("In fact, most Supreme Court opinions never come to the
attention of Congress.").
307. See Mikva, supra note 10, at 609 ("Unlike judges, the Representatives and Sena-
tors are almost totally dependent on the recommendations of others in making constitu-
tional judgments."). But cf. Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 161, at 728-31
(defending Congress's institutional capacity as an independent interpreter, especially in
light of improvement made during the past three decades).
308. 141 CONG. REc. S4450 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1995).
309. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law (1897), reprinted in AMERICAN
LEGAL REALISM 17 (William W. Fisher III et al. eds., 1993).
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nizes courts will have the "final" say, but asserts Senators must
exercise some judgment of their own; they cannot simply abdicate in-
terpretive responsibility, leaving the courts not just the final say, but
the only say.
The Line Item Veto Act notably provides for special judicial re-
view, which allows any member of Congress challenging the legisla-
tion's constitutionality to seek a declaratory judgment and injunctive
relief before the appropriate district court, and for direct and expe-
dited appeal to the Supreme Court.3 10 What does the adoption of
such a procedure suggest about Congress's self-image as an inter-
preter?311 Perhaps it evinces Congress's lack of confidence in its own
views, and a desire to have more "learned" persons address constitu-
tional questions. Is Congress conceding its immateriality as an inter-
preter? It seems likely that if Congress had a more entrenched
practice of rigorous debate about the constitutionality of legislative
acts, Congress would have been less inclined to include such a mea-
sure in the Act. Provisions like this merely highlight Congress's un-
certainty about its own role as an interpreter and discomfort with its
own capacity to render judgments about the Constitution's
meaning.312
This cursory review of Congress's performance with the Line
Item Veto Act reveals that although constitutional issues were plainly
implicated, legislators seemed uncertain about their roles as interpret-
ers, and less than thorough in exploring the substantive constitutional
matters at hand. While Senator Byrd's statement is far from a fully
articulated guide for a "conscientious legislator," his posture is com-
pelling, and suggests precisely the kind of role I envision for members
310. Pub. L. No. 104-130, § 3(a)-(c), 110 Stat. 1211-12 (1996). Senator Simon stated
upon introducing the judicial review amendment in the Senate, "What we do not want is to
live in limbo." 141 CONG. REc. 54244 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1995).
Six members of Congress filed suit on January 2, 1997 in federal court in Washington,
D.C., challenging the constitutionality of the Line Item Veto Act. That Court declared the
Line Item Veto Act unconstitutional. See Byrd v. Raines, No. 97-0001 (D.D.C. Apr. 10,
1997).
311. Cf. Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 161, at 719-22 (recounting de-
bate among Senators during 1984 on another line-item veto proposal and the role of the
Senate as an independent constitutional interpreter).
312. The inclusion of such provisions in legislation appears to be increasingly frequent.
See, e.g., The Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56
(1996) (regulating the Internet); The Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110
Stat. 2419 (1996) (see infra Part IV.A.2); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1994) (providing for
direct appeal to the Supreme Court from decisions by three-judge district court panels);
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION 2D § 4040 (1988 &
Supp. 1996) (discussing three-judge district courts).
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of Congress under recast judicial supremacy. Yet just as Mikva and
Brest each express serious doubts about the capacity of Congress to
fulfill the aspirations they set out,31 3 1 am skeptical about its ability to
fulfill, with skill and vigor, the role which recast judicial supremacy
encourages members of Congress to occupy. As Mikva observes,
"The very knowledge that the courts are there, as the ultimate
naysayers, increases the tendency to pass the issue on, particularly if it
is politically controversial. ' 314 It is a movement of legislators away
from an unhealthy reliance on courts which recast judicial supremacy
seeks to effect. Yet the existing dynamic may be too difficult for legis-
lators to resist. Indeed, Senator Byrd may well share this pessimism,
as indicated when he quipped to his colleagues: "I know it is old fash-
ioned to read the Constitution anymore around here. '31 5
2. The Defense of Marriage Act
Congress's experience with another piece of contentious and po-
litically charged legislation provides an additional occasion to assess
its role as an interpreter. During the Fall of 1996, Congress passed the
Defense of Marriage Act. It provides:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian
tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or
judicial proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or
tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex
that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State,
territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from
such relationship.316
The statute also states that for purposes of federal law the word "mar-
riage" means only the legal union between a man and a woman, and
"spouse" means a hhsband or wife of the opposite sex.317
Introduction of the legislation was prompted in part by litigation
in the Hawaii courts,318 which presents the possibility that the State
will soon recognize as legal a marriage between persons of the same
gender. Before the Act had been passed in either the House or the
313. But cf. Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 161 (expressing confidence
in Congress's ability to function as a constitutional interpreter).
314. Mikva, supra note 10, at 610.
315. 141 CONG. REc. S4225 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1995).
316. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 2(a), 110 Stat. 2419 (1996)..
317. Id. at § 3.
318. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (holding that statute restricting mari-
tal relations to unions between males and females establishes sex-based classification
which is subject to "strict scrutiny" test in equal protection challenge brought under the
Hawaii Constitution), appeal after remand sub nom. Baehr v. Miike, 910 P.2d 112 (Haw.
1996).
Senate, President Clinton pledged to sign it. But the Defense of Mar-
riage Act presents profound constitutional questions. To begin with,
there is the now-familiar issue of Congress's authority to enact the
Act. The source of Congress's authority to pass the Defense of Mar-
riage Act is not self-evident. Some supporters of the Act contend the
Constitution's Full Faith and Credit Clause319 provides the requisite
authorization. 320 But the Full Faith and Credit Clause can be under-
stood as either having no bearing on,321 or inconsistent with, the pro-
posed Act. In addition, there is the question whether the Act violates
one or more of the Constitution's "negative prohibitions," such as the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments.
The principal debate in the House about the Defense of Marriage
Act occurred on July 11 and 12, 1996. As with the Line Item Veto
Act, viewed through the lens of floor debate, Congress's performance
as a constitutional interpreter was mixed. But numerous statements
made on the House floor provide hope for the ideal of congressional
interpretation. Three in particular warrant attention. The first is a
statement by Congressman Skaggs, analyzing the text of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause. Skaggs discussed the meaning of the Clause, in-
cluding its "Enabling Clause," and the implications of adopting one
reading of the text over another.322 Without regard for the substance
of Skaggs's viewpoint, Skaggs's approach seems quite right. He per-
sonally considered a relevant constitutional issue presented by legisla-
tion before the House-without deferring completely to the courts, or
relying exclusively on the views of law professors-thereby accepting
319. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. The Clause provides: "Full Faith and Credit shall be
given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other
State; And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts,
Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof." Id.
320. The argument turns on the Clause's "enabling clause," which provides that "Con-
gress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which... Acts, Records and Proceed-
ings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof." Id. Defenders assert the Defense of
Marriage Act is such a "general law" prescribing the "effects" of acts, records and proceed-
ings involving marriage. But see Letter from Laurence H. Tribe to Senator Kennedy, 142
CONG. REc. S5931 (daily ed. June 6, 1996) (calling that view "a play on words, not a legal
argument").
321. Some contend the Defense of Marriage Act is unnecessary because whatever
power states have to refuse to accept other states' recognitions of marriages would not be
expanded or contracted by the Act. See 142 CONG. REc. H7489, H7491 (daily ed. July 12,
1996) (Congressman Moran and Skaggs expressing this view); see also Laurence H. Tribe,
Toward a Less Perfect Union, N.Y. Ti~rms, May 25, 1996, at 11 (explaining "states need no
Congressional license to deny effect to whatever marriages (or other matters) may fall
within" the so-called public policy exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause).
322. See 142 CONG. REc. H7491-92 (daily ed. July 12, 1996).
winter 19971 JUDICIAL SUPREMACY
428 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 24:359
his responsibilities as a constitutional officer and advancing the nor-
mative ideal of a diffusion of interpretive responsibility.
Congressman Abercrombie also approached the Defense of Mar-
riage Act in a manner one might expect from a responsible congres-
sional interpreter. He carefully reflected on the constitutional
implications of the Act. In doing so he invoked the opinions of legal
scholars323 and considered the possible relevance of a recent Supreme
Court decision.3 24 But he also developed and offered his own inter-
pretive judgments.325 This balanced approach is a useful example of
how members of Congress ought to undertake their interpretive tasks.
Understandably, supporters of the legislation discussed the Con-
stitution less often than critics. As Brest has noted, "Opponents of
particular bills sometimes seem to voice constitutional doubts as rhe-
torical stratagems, while proponents avoid paying attention to poten-
tially damaging constitutional questions, preferring to leave them to a
later judicial test.' '326 But during debate on the Defense of Marriage
Act, Congressman Hyde, a proponent of the Act, rose to address its
constitutionality and the relevance of a recent Supreme Court opin-
ion.327 He and Congressman Frank, a detractor of the Act, exchanged
views about Romer v. Evans, in which the Supreme Court declared
unconstitutional an amendment to the Colorado Constitution which
precluded all government action designed to protect homosexuals. 328
While invocation of Supreme Court decisions is preferable to ignoring
them, reliance on them as a mere predictor of what the courts will do
323. Abercrombie cited the views of Professors Eskridge and Tribe. See 142 CONG.
REc. H7449 (daily ed. July 11, 1996).
324. Abercrombie discussed Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996), which found un-
constitutional an amendment to the Colorado Constitution that prohibited all legislative,
executive, or judicial action designed to protect homosexuals from discrimination. He
stated that "[tIhis case suggests that the Supreme Court will rule legislation motivated by
animus against gays and lesbians unconstitutional ... unless the legislative classification
bears a rational relationship to a legitimate State purpose. In other words, since [the De-
fense of Marriage Act] targets a group of people due to ... [their lifestyle] ... it is likely to
be struck down by the courts." See 142 CONG. REc. H7449 (daily ed. July 11, 1996).
325. Abercrombie questioned Congress's authority under the Constitution to enact the
Act. He then noted his disbelief that many supporters of the Defense of Marriage Act are
also supporters of H.R. 2270, which would require Congress to specify its power under the
Constitution for the enactment of any law. See supra note 277. Abercrombie asked his
colleagues: "Where in [A]rticle I or anywhere else in the Constitution is the Congress
given authority to write a national marriage law? Maybe the sponsors of both bills don't
see the contradiction. Maybe they just don't care." See 142 CONG. REc. H7449 (daily ed.
July 11, 1996).
326. Brest, supra note 282, at 93.
327. See 142 CONG. Rc. H7500-01 (daily ed. July 12, 1996).
328. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. 1620.
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is an imperfect exercise of interpretive judgment. Hyde's and Frank's
remarks were promising, however, because they suggested that their
consideration of Romer transcended prediction. Congressmen Frank
and Hyde appear to understand the importance of heeding court judg-
ments and principles, but they nonetheless exercised their own delib-
erative capacities and developed their own views about the
constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act.
Before the House passed the Defense of Marriage Act, Senator
Kennedy asked Tribe to review the legislation and consider its consti-
tutionality. In his response, entered into the Congressional Record,
Tribe wrote: "Congress... has a solemn duty to take seriously the
constitutional boundaries of its affirmative authority" to enact legisla-
tion.329 Tribe argued that enactment of the Act would evidence a fail-
ure to abide by this duty.330 While I do not believe a vote for or
against the measure necessarily indicates a shirking of interpretive re-
sponsibilities, as I have argued throughout this section, I fully concur
that Congress has such a duty. The approaches of the four House
members just described, and that of Senator Byrd in relation to the
Line Item Veto Act, illustrate how other members of Congress may
transform themselves into more consistent, self-conscious interpreters.
It is not enough for members of Congress to demonstrate sporadic
interest in constitutional questions-limited to occasions when law
and mass politics intersect (e.g., abortion) or when members' own in-
terests are implicated (e.g., campaign finance reform and the First
Amendment). 331 Instead, they should address constitutional ques-
tions whenever they arise, and contribute to our society's dialogue
about the meaning of the Constitution.
B. Judicial Independence and Judicial Critics
The recent commotion over criticism of judges also demonstrates
the relevance and importance of the "who interprets" question. Dur-
ing the past several years, numerous public officials have rebuked sit-
ting federal judges. While not all of these rebukes have focused on
interpretations of the Constitution, many have. It would be naive to
329. Letter from Laurence Tribe to Senator Kennedy, supra note 320, at S5931; see also
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTITUONAL LAW, supra note 30, § 3-4, at 39 ("Congress
must... be recognized as having the power and the duty to interpret the document in a
way that may command the respect of others.").
330. See Letter from Laurence Tribe to Senator Kennedy, supra note 320, at S5931.
331. Many questions before Congress which implicate constitutional meaning never
come before the courts. See supra Part II.B. Therefore, it is imperative that Congress be
generally proficient and rehearsed as a constitutional interpreter.
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suggest these recent comments are not politically motivated, and it
would be generous to characterize them as the product of careful scru-
tiny of, or reflection about, judicial opinions. Nevertheless, the ex-
pression of public criticism of judges by members of the legislative and
executive branches invites consideration about the appropriate
boundary between legitimate expression of contrary views and unwel-
come impingement on the operation of the judiciary.
The most notable incident of 1996 was prompted by a decision of
United States District Judge Harold Baer, Jr. The uproar concerned
an evidentiary ruling by Baer in a criminal trial. Baer, appointed by
President Clinton to the Southern District of New York, had excluded
from evidence drugs found in the trunk of a car, which the police re-
covered after four men placed duffel bags in the defendant's car and
then fled when the police arrived. 32
In his opinion explaining the exclusion of the evidence, Baer
noted the federal prosecution of a police officer in an anticrime unit
operating in the same neighborhood where the drug seizure occurred.
Baer then wrote, "After the attendant publicity surrounding
the[se] ... events, had the men not run when the cops began to stare
at them, it would have been unusual."333 Because their flight did not
provide reasonable suspicion "that criminal activity was afoot," Baer
found the police did not have requisite cause to suspect criminal activ-
ity when they stopped the defendant, and declared the investigatory
stop illegal.3
The judge's ruling, based in part upon his understanding of the
Fourth Amendment, came to the attention of political leaders, who
denounced it. Among the critics was Bob Dole, then the presumptive
Republican nominee for President. Another was President Clinton,
who, speaking through a spokesperson, suggested he might solicit
Baer's resignation. 5
Before criticism of Baer had run its course, he changed his mind.
Citing supplemental testimony proffered after his initial decision, he
modified his ruling and admitted the evidence . 3 6 But the Baer inci-
dent ignited a vigorous, albeit indirect, exchange between politicians
and members of the federal judiciary. Four judges from the United
332. See United States v. Bayless, 913 F. Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
333. Bayless, 913 F. Supp. at 242.
334. Id.
335. See Judges Accuse White House of Intimidating Jurist, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 29,
1996, at 19 (recounting that White House spokesman called Baer's ruling "wrongheaded"
and said President Clinton might ask Baer to resign).
336. See Bayless, 921 F. Supp. 211.
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit3 37 issued a statement
defending Baer and objecting to the criticisms as an inappropriate en-
croachment on the independence of the judiciary. 38 Other prominent
federal judges also publicly expressed their concern over the re-
proaches of Baer.339 Even Chief Justice Rehnquist-without directly
referring to Baer-delivered a speech emphasizing the importance of
judicial independence. 340
Many of those uneasy with politicians' denunciations of Baer's
opinion voiced concerns that such statements would undermine the
separation of powers among the branches of the federal government.
This view was expressed strongly by Judge Louis Pollak, who com-
mented that "[it is not the province and duty of the President, or of
the Majority Leader, or of the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee [to say what the law is]."' 341 Following the Baer incident, Rehn-
quist called "an independent judiciary with the authority to finally
interpret a written constitution" one of the "crown jewels of our sys-
tem of government. 342
Politicians, however, refused to acquiesce completely to the no-
tion that judges should be free from critiques of nonjudges. President
Clinton asserted that judges are not entitled to "a gag rule on every-
body else."'343 Bob Dole exclaimed in a speech that "there is nothing
in the Constitution... [saying that judges] should not be held up to
scrutiny for their actions." 3 " Even a Wall Street Journal editorial pos-
ited that the First Amendment itself protects criticism of judges, in-
cluding those made by politicians. 345
337. The Second Circuit hears appeals from the Southern District of New York.
338. See Second Circuit Chief Judges Criticize Attacks on Judge Baer, N.Y. L.J., March
29, 1996, at 4 [hereinafter Second Circuit Judges Criticize] ("These attacks do a grave dis-
service to the principle of an independent judiciary, and, more significantly, mislead the
public as to the role of judges in a constitutional democracy.").
339. See, e.g., Gilbert Merritt, Judge-Bashing Only Undermines Public Confidence in
Judiciary, NAsHvi.LE BANNER, July 3, 1996, at All (Chief Judge of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit); Louis H. Pollak, Criticizing Judges, Address Deliv-
ered at University of Pennsylvania Law Review Banquet (April 12, 1996) (United States
District Judge, Eastern District of Pennsylvania).
340. William Rehnquist, Remarks at Washington College of Law Centennial Celebra-
tion Plenary Academic Panel: The Future of the Federal Courts (April 9, 1996).
341. Pollak, supra note 339, at 11-12.
342. Rehnquist, supra note 340, at 17 (emphasis added).
343. Paul Richter, Clinton Defends His Criticism of Judge, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1996, at
13.
344. Senator Bob Dole, Address at American Society of Newspaper Editors (April 19,
1996) (transcript available from Federal News Service).
345. See Jurist, Heal Thyself, WALL ST. J., Apr. 3, 1996, at A14.
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In defending judicial independence some judges recognized the
validity-even the virtue-of criticism of judges. Chief Judge Merritt
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, explained
that "[u]p to a point, strong public criticism of judges is healthy. ' 34 6
Rehnquist proffered that the principle that judges' rulings would not
be the basis for their removal from the bench-a lesson emanating
from the Senate's decision during 1805 impeachment proceedings not
to convict Associate Justice Samuel Chase-"obviously does not
mean that federal judges should not be criticized for the decisions
which they make."3 47
My advocacy of diffuse interpretive responsibility, which recast
account judicial supremacy requires, would suggest I disagree with the
most extreme view that judges should not be criticized by nonjudicial
officers of the federal government. I do. Yet I also readily agree that
judge-bashing, described by Merritt as "public criticism that is often
unthinking and intemperate, sometimes apoplectic, ' 348 is unwelcome
and unhelpful but not atypical. No account of diffuse interpretive re-
sponsibility, be it departmentalism or a view of judicial supremacy like
my own, should ever be used to justify underinformed, politically ex-
pedient criticism of judges.
The unsatisfactory nature of recent exchanges about judicial inde-
pendence was clearly evidenced by events related to Judge H. Lee
Sarokin of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
After a lengthy tenure on the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey, President Clinton appointed Sarokin to the
Third Circuit in 1994. Sarokin became a favorite target of Republi-
cans, who took issue with a number of his rulings, including his decla-
ration that a municipal library's policy barring a homeless person
violated the First Amendment,349 and his release from prison of for-
mer boxer Ruben "Hurricane" Carter upon determining Carter's con-
stitutional rights had been violated during his murder trial.3
346. Merritt, supra note 339; see also Second Circuit Judges Criticize, supra note 338, at
4 (Second Circuit judges noting that "[w]e have no quarrel with criticism of any decision of
any judge. Informed comment and disagreement from lawyers, academicians, and public
officials have been hallmarks of the American legal tradition. But there is an important
line between legitimate criticism of a decision and illegitimate attack on a judge.").
347. Rehnquist, supra note 340, at 15.
348. Merritt, supra note 339.
349. See Kreimer v. Bureau of Police, 765 F. Supp. 181 (D.N.J. 1991), rev'd, 958 F.2d
1242 (3d Cir. 1992).
350. See Carter v. Rafferty, 621 F. Supp. 533 (D.N.J. 1985), affd in part, dismissed in
part, 826 F.2d 1299 (3d Cir. 1987).
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Like Baer, Sarokin became the object of Bob Dole's scrutiny. In
numerous speeches Dole criticized Sarokin by name, suggested he was
unfit to sit on the federal bench, and placed him in his "judicial hall of
shame."'35 1 Among Dole's charges was the assertion that Sarokin
"twists the Constitution to impose his liberal views of social policy." '352
The attacks on Sarokin by Dole and others apparently took their
toll. In a June 4, 1996 letter, Sarokin notified President Clinton he
would leave the bench effective July 31, 1996.353 Alluding to adver-
tisements run in 1988 against Presidential Candidate Michael
Dukakis, Sarokin complained that some sought to "'Willie Hortonize'
the federal judiciary," making him a "prime target[ ]."1354 In a letter
marked with both anger and disbelief, he wrote: "It is ironic that I do
not stand charged with misconduct, but rather with protecting the con-
stitutional rights of persons accused of crimes-a somewhat astonish-
ing accusation to be leveled against a federal judge. '355 Moreover,
Sarokin observed that "[t]he current tactics will affect the indepen-
dence of the judiciary and the public's confidence in it, without which
it cannot survive. 35 6
Sarokin also wrote in his letter to the President:
So long as I was the focus of criticism for my own opinions, I
was designed to take the abuse no matter how unfair or untrue,
but the first moment I considered whether or how an opinion I
was preparing would be used was the moment I decided that I
could no longer serve as a federal judge.357
Because Sarokin concluded criticisms of him had affected his work, he
decided to retire.
351. Dole, supra note 344.
352. Id.
353. As a technical matter, Sarokin "retired" rather than resigned from the bench.
Sarokin's decision to retire followed soon after the Third Circuit denied his request to
move his chambers to California when he became a senior judge, which was to take place
during the Fall of 1996. Some speculated his resignation was prompted more by the refusal
of his request than his stated concerns about the politicization of his work on the bench.
See, e.g, Lisa Brennan, California Dreamin', N.J. LJ., June 10, 1996, at 6; Thomas L. Jip-
ping, The End of a Dream-Or the Beginning of a Cushy Pension?, WASH. TiMEs, June 6,
1996, at A17 (Op-Ed). Sarokin strongly denied this in a letter to his colleagues on the
Third Circuit. See Letter from H. Lee Sarokin to Third Circuit Judicial Colleagues (June
10, 1996), in N.J. LAWYER, June 1996, at 19. I was a law clerk on the Third Circuit at the
time of Sarokin's resignation and, based on my knowledge and experiences, I have no
reason to believe Sarokin's reasons were other than those expressed in his letters.
354. Letter from H. Lee Sarokin to President Clinton (June 4, 1996), in N.J. L.J., June
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Like others, I question the efficacy of Sarokin's resignation as an
effort to depoliticize judging.358 But I have little doubt that increased
hostility toward federal judges of the sort directed toward Baer and
Sarokin disserves efforts to promote a diffusion of interpretive respon-
sibility.3 19 One might observe optimistically that judges and their crit-
ics have stumbled onto some common ground by admitting that
judges should not be immune from criticism but recognizing that
judges should not be intimidated to the point their independent judg-
ment is impaired. Yet this commonground is muddled. For instance,
up to what point is public criticism healthy? When, or under what
conditions, is the criticism legitimate? The recent furor did nothing to
answer these truly hard questions.
Directing attention to the issues raised in this Article would fos-
ter the development of answers to these questions. Careful considera-
tion of the normative and descriptive dimensions of the "who
interprets" problem would have imposed structure upon, and im-
proved the quality of, recent debates over judicial independence and
criticism of judges. It would also-perhaps most usefully-allow citi-
zens to differentiate more easily between principled criticisms and po-
litically expedient ones. 360
Indeed, consideration about who interprets would facilitate con-
structive deliberation about scores of substantive issues. Discussion of
how the who interprets query relates to the Line Item Veto, the De-
fense of Marriage Act, and the politics of "judge-bashing" should have
made evident that the descriptive and normative dimensions of nonju-
dicial interpretation of the Constitution are central to the conduct of
responsible and productive public discourse.
358. See Judge Sarokin's Retreat N.Y. TIMEs, June 7, 1996, at A30 (contending that, in
leaving, Sarokin "has given politicians fresh incentive to target judges in the hope they can
bully them into resigning or fashioning decisions to avoid political censure").
359. A further danger posed by such rampant and unprincipled criticism is that it un-
dermines the legitimacy of the judiciary. Cf. supra Part II.B.2; Merritt, supra note 339
("The independence of the judiciary is fragile and rests in large measure upon the contin-
ued confidence of the public.").
360. Confirmation battles over nominees to the federal judiciary have received consid-
erable attention in recent years. Several books and articles have discussed the appropriate
role of the political branches in the confirmation process, and the bearing of the process on
judicial independence. See, e.g., STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS: CLEAN-
ING Up THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENT PROCESS (1994); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Confirma-
tion Mystery, 83 GEo. W. 395 (1994) (review of Carter's book); Michael Stokes Paulsen,
Straightening Out The Confirmation Mess, 105 YALE W. 549 (1995) (same).
C. Proposition 187 and Some Tough Questions for Nonjudicial
Interpreters
Part III of this Article advanced a recast account of judicial
supremacy, and described the normative appeal of diffuse interpretive
responsibility. The first subpart of Part IV suggested the value of a
more active interpretive role for Congress. Yet these discussions
leave significant dimensions of the practice of diffuse interpretive re-
sponsibility unsettled.
Some of the critical questions related to the ideal of interpretive
diffusion were raised in the case of California's Proposition 187,361 the
ballot initiative of November 1994 concerning immigration and public
benefits for noncitizens in a variety of contexts. Leaving aside both
general arguments about the virtues of ballot initiatives362 and court
decisions evaluating the legality of Proposition 187,363 the circum-
stances surrounding this much debated policy provide occasion for
identifying problems related to determining the specific interpretive
roles for state officials and citizens actors. These problems are also
important for, and relevant to, efforts by the executive and Congress
to ascertain how they should contribute to the interpretive process.
I mention-without addressing in detail-three interrelated
themes which arose in the context of Proposition 187: (1) discerning
the scope or reach of a judicial opinion; (2) determining whether, and
when, forms of nonacquiescence with judicial opinions are permissi-
ble; and (3) evaluating when court judgments are "ripe" for
consideration.
Since Proposition 187 was a popular referendum, the voters of
California were placed in the position of citizen-legislators. 364 What
regard, if any, should they have given to previous Court judgments in
deciding how to act themselves? Many opponents of Proposition 187,
and even some of its supporters, contended there are elements of it
361. See Tony Miller, Acting Secretary of State, Proposition 187, in CALIFORNIA BAL-
LOT PAMPHLET, GENERAL ELECTION, November 8, 1994, at 50-55, 91-92 (1994).
362. See David B. Magleby, Governing by lnitiativa Let the Voters Decide?, 66 U.
COLO. L. REv. 13 (1995) (a general assessment of this method of deliberation and
lawmaking).
363. See United States v. de Cruz, 82 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 1996); Gregorio T. By and
Through Jose T. v. Wilson, 59 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 1995); League of United Latin American
Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755 (C.D. Cal. 1995); Wilson v. City of San Jose, 1995 WL
241452 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 1995).
364. Citizens, of course, do not take an oath to uphold or affirm the Constitution.
Should this make any difference in assessing the character of their actions when placed in
the role of legislators?
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which conflict with the Supreme Court's decision in Plyler v. Doe.365
This raises questions about the scope of a judicial decision's authority.
Plyler and Proposition 187 may provide a relatively clear case of the
applicability of a prior Court holding to a subsequent fact pattern.
But as a general matter, the scope of judicial decisions is hardly self-
evident. And the problem of line-drawing is made more difficult
when one considers claims that court judgments apply only to the par-
ties to a case and no one else.366 If this were so, Plyler would have no
bearing on a nonjudicial judgment about whether or not to adopt
Proposition 187.
A second issue concerns the right of nonparties to refuse to ad-
here to interpretations of law reflected in judicial opinions.367 If it
were clear, and accepted, that a particular court holding applied in a
given circumstance, could that decision nonetheless be disregarded?
Can those who admit Plyler's applicability elect to disobey its
precepts?
Finally, there is the problem of ascertaining when a judicial deci-
sion is ripe for reconsideration. Are judgments "fair game" as soon as
they are rendered? For those who reject judicial supremacy, and
maintain that a court's decision applies only to the parties to a case,
surely a holding-let alone a "principle"-is ripe for immediate re-
consideration.3 68 Furthermore, a legislator (or a citizen empowered to
legislate) might decide to ignore any court judgments on the ground
that any law supposedly in tension with a court decision is merely an
invitation to courts to reconsider that previous decision.369 Is either of
these views compelling?
Recast judicial supremacy supplies some resolute answers, and
some less definite answers, to these three problems which are central
to any nonjudicial interpretive deliberation. Judicial supremacy un-
365. 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (finding unconstitutional Texas's allowance of denial of public
education to illegal alien children).
366. Cf. supra note 65.
367. See Paul L. Colby, Two Views on the Legitimacy of Nonacquiescence in Judicial
Opinions, 61 TUL. L. REv. 1041 (1987); FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES, supra note
161, at 221-30 (discussing executive and legislative noncompliance with judicial judgments).
368. See Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTIrUTIoNAL LAW, supra note 30, § 3-3, at 26-32 (on the
normative breadth of a judgment of unconstitutionality).
369. See, e.g., Human Life Bilk Hearings on S. 158 Before the Subcomm. on Separation
of Powers of the Comm. on the Judiciary, reprinted in Brest, supra note 282, at 77 (testi-
mony of John Noonan, explaining: "A decision of the Supreme Court interpreting the
Constitution is neither infallible nor eternal nor unchangeable .... The proposed Act
[overruling Roe v. Wade] is an invitation for the Court to correct itself."). Easterbrook
offers a similar conception, stating legislators "may vote for a bill that the Court has held
unconstitutional, in order to prompt change." Easterbrook, supra note 63, at 911.
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questionably presupposes that judicial opinions and interpretations
extend beyond the parties to the case of decision. How broadly is
unclear; yet it simply cannot be correct that judicial opinions are only
for other judges to use in deciding future cases, rather than for citizens
and government officials to use in deciding how to act.37°
As for nonacquiescence, recast judicial supremacy involves en-
couraging other branches to engage in interpretation. But it requires
widespread acceptance of the idea that courts decide meaning and
when a court has spoken on an issue its views warrant adherence. The
more specific a court's view, and the more relevant a view is to a par-
ticular circumstance, the less uncertainty there should be about what
fidelity to that court's judgment mandates. Outright noncompliance,
however, is always inconsistent with judicial supremacy of any form.
With regard to ripeness, it might appear that the use of defiance
of prior court decisions to invite their reconsideration actually affirms
judicial supremacy by conceding the judiciary's authority to settle a
matter finally. In actuality, what such an approach does is strip opin-
ions of any lasting meaning, and in so doing renders judicial
supremacy itself meaningless-converting it to a weak form of judicial
review.
Less clear is how nonjudicial interpreters should ascertain what
judicial judgments prescribe and proscribe, and how broadly judicial
opinions are to be applied. Also far from definite is how to distin-
guish noncompliance from appropriate efforts to seek reconsideration.
What conceptions and principles should, and will, guide the develop-
ment of answers to these dilemmas?
My sense is that the only principles which should inform the per-
spectives of nonjudicial actors about these matters are those which
constitute the fabric of the recast judicial supremacy. This form of
judicial supremacy derives its strength from the tension arising from,
and the interactivity engendered by, simultaneously embracing judi-
cial authoritativeness while recognizing that authoritativeness is tem-
pered and constrained by intellectual and institutional
interdependence among the branches of the government, and with
"the people." Aside from the clear requirements just outlined above,
evaluations about scope, nonacquiescence and ripeness should be in-
370. Cf. Louis H. Pollak, The Republic for Which It Stands, 24 LAND & WATER L. REV.
565 (1989) (discussing deference owed by state governor to a decision of the U.S. Supreme
Court in deciding whether to veto legislation). But cf. Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opin-
ions as Binding Law and as Explanations for Judgments, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 43 (1993)
(suggesting judicial opinions ought to be regarded as explanations for judgments, and that
they do not impose direct obligation of obedience).
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formed by perceptions and commitments which recast judicial
supremacy begets. Assessment by nonjudicial actors about these
problems will be shaped and restrained by the same forces which op-
erate on the judiciary and render its "final" judgments neither insular
nor truly final.
V. Concluding Thoughts
This Article has advanced an account of judicial supremacy which
both aptly describes our existing interpretive regime and fosters an
enriched interpretive scheme. There are dynamics already in place
which prevent judicial interpretation from being insular and which
render "final" interpretations less than truly final. We should utilize
these dynamics to encourage nonjudicial interpretation, while retain-
ing the precept that courts have the final say about constitutional
meaning. For the reasons set forth here, this recast account of judicial
supremacy is uniquely well suited to serve a range of needs of our
political and legal cultures.
I am under no illusion that the claims advanced here will per-
suade everyone. I do hope, however, that I have convinced readers of
the importance of the question regarding who interprets the Constitu-
tion. Not only are the query and attendant issues of great practical
significance and theoretical interest, but they are central to developing
a rich understanding of ourselves, "the people."
With this project I have attempted to confront the challenges
presented by critics of judicial supremacy, and build on their insights,
without foregoing the virtues afforded by a reconceived understanding
of the interpretive process. I have also argued for the necessity of a
diffusion of interpretive responsibility, while conceding that hard
questions remain and will challenge efforts to effectuate a truly mean-
ingful diffuse interpretive process. Without serious and sustained in-
put from sources outside the judiciary, judicial supremacy remains
susceptible to the potent attacks of its critics. More importantly, how-
ever, without such a diffusion, our constitutional discourse is weak-
ened and the legitimacy of the courts threatened.
Moreover, I have not only embraced recast judicial supremacy as
a normatively compelling conception of constitutional interpretation,
but also maintained it provides an apt, albeit imperfect, description of
our existing legal order. Many of the dimensions of judicial absti-
nence from interpretation result from voluntary allocations of inter-
pretive responsibility. The extent to which nonjudicial actors
presently take seriously their potential roles as interpretive agents,
however, is minimal. In this regard, current interpretive dynamics are
deficient. Indeed, the model of judicial supremacy I have detailed is
nascent-it appropriately describes elements of contemporary inter-
pretive processes, yet its normative objectives have not yet been real-
ized fully.
Before concluding, one more point warrants attention. It in-
volves a limitation of any comprehensive account of constitutional in-
terpretation. In my view, the dynamism and interdependence which
characterize the interpretive process reflect the fact that law is, at its
core, a form of "politics." By this I do not refer to politics in the
pejorative sense, as many commentators use the term in exploring the
relationship of law and politics.37 ' Rather, in the broadest sense, the
subject of politics is the fundamental choices a polity makes about
how to order social life.3 72
Constitutional law will always be subordinate to, although it
surely influences, the underlying dynamics which shape our commit-
ments and sensibilities. Insofar as constitutional debate implicates un-
derlying values and concerns, interpretive processes will be informed,
and perhaps propelled, by them. While Tocqueville's observation that
"[t]here is hardly a political question in the United States which does
not sooner or later turn into a judicial one"373 may be of enduring
poignancy, it surely is not the case that the Constitution is the exhaus-
tive embodiment of our ideals. Both constitutional and extra-consti-
tutional values together serve as an engine for interbranch exchange
under judicial supremacy, and guard against static interpretation or
judicial hegemony.
371. See, e.g., BoRK, supra note 18, at 348-49; cf DON HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES: A
CRITIQUE OF CONSENT THEORY 110-47 (1989) (discussing three versions of the law/politics
distinction); MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTnrTION IN THE COURTS 202-04 (1994) (argu-
ing constitutional adjudication is both law and politics); TusHNET, supra note 18; Philip
Bobbitt, Is Law Politics?, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1233 (1989).
372. For an instructive treatment and short history of the view that law is a form of
politics, see Martin Shapiro, Morality and the Politics of Judging, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1555,
1555-59 (1989). Shapiro appropriately scolds his colleagues for their facile use of the term,
and harks back to more comprehensive notions of what "politics" is about. "Politics ... is
the pursuit of virtue, the attempt to achieve the good person in the good state. Law being
an instrument and a product of this pursuit, is indeed a subspecies of politics." Id. at 1558.
One need not embrace Shapiro's allusions to an Aristotelian vision of the "good" to recog-
nize that his comments about law also include the Constitution. Constitutional struggles
do not exhaust the scope of pursuits of our most fundamental aspirations, or circumscribe
the clashes which accompany them.
373. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEviLLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 270 (J.P. Mayer ed., George
Lawrence trans., 13th ed. 1969) (1850).
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Speaking of the limits of constitutional adjudication and forms of
argument, Philip Bobbitt professes that "[w]e are incapable of making
something that will obviate (rather than suppress) the requirement for
moral decision. '374 While reserving judgment about his conception of
the relationship between law and moral choices, I am persuaded Bob-
bitt has aptly captured the notion that law, or the Constitution, is not
the end of the line among the layers of conflict and challenges which
characterize social life.375
Law's unsettled character may likewise suggest that constitutional
interpretation is a form of politics in the grandest sense. Precise an-
swers to some questions are largely unattainable. We cannot hope to
develop perfectly full and clear answers about how to proceed.
Notwithstanding this inevitable indeterminacy and the difficulty in as-
certaining clear boundaries and easily applied principles, under recast
judicial supremacy actors' roles are clarified, self-reflection is en-
hanced, and consciousness about constitutional meaning is raised.
Fully realized, recast judicial supremacy promotes virtues and instills
values which render it the most appropriate interpretive scheme for
our polity and our constitutional order.
374. BoBBrrr, supra note 18.
375. Some have advanced the idea that the norms and practices developed or endorsed
for living well under our constitutional order may be displaced in times of crisis. An argu-
ment can be made that constitutional rules and principles are circumscribed by other con-
siderations in extraordinary times. See, e.g., Rosenfeld, supra note 168, at 147 (positing
that the ordinary constitutional scheme might call for "judicial supremacy with respect to
the judgments of courts" while such a convention might be inappropriate "under those
highly unusual circumstances where acquiescence in court judgments would create or exac-
erbate a potentially destructive constitutional crisis"). Commentators often point to Lin-
coln's refusal to abide by the Court's judgment in Ex parte Merryman as a leading example
of justified nonacquiescence. Leaving aside the problem of how to identify these times, or
of resolving disagreement about whether a given occasion amounts to such a crisis, con-
templating such a possibility further suggests that in a fundamental sense the Constitution
is embedded in an overarching set of political and social challenges.
